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I. INTRODUCTION 
The aerial images are compelling: a transformed landscape 
littered with fallen trees, or charred from fires set to clear the land. 
Terraced patterns, created by roads, surround interspersed, 
regularly spaced plantings. A sharp demarcation divides this bare 
terrain from what remains of the tropical forest, extending far into 
the distance. This is what “deforestation” looks like in Riau and 
Papua, Indonesia1, Borneo, and other regions where oil palm 
plantations have supplanted huge areas of primal forests.2 
There are many other instances occurring across Southeast 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa of tropical forest conversion 
resulting from the growing demand for valuable “soft” commodities 
such as palm oil, timber, cattle, and soybeans. The transition of 
land use from forest to commercial-scale agriculture has been a 
major cause of the widespread loss of these critical natural 
resources. This systemic modification of forest landscapes has had 
a significant adverse impact on the ecological systems and 
biodiversity of the regions, and has created social conflict. In 
addition to causing pollution locally and across national borders, 
destruction of forests contributes to global climate change. After 
trees are razed or peatlands are burned, the carbon that had been 
sequestered in those natural ecosystems is released into the 
atmosphere as greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.  Why have 
these destructive practices proven so intractable? To address this 
question, this Article examines the drivers and impacts of 
deforestation, the overlapping private and public systems of 
governance developed to combat it, and the challenges to their 
effectiveness. To understand these overlapping efforts in a specific 
context, this Article focuses on palm oil, one of the principal 
 
1. Justin Gillis, Companies Take the Baton in Climate Change Efforts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/business/energy-
environment/passing-the-baton-in-climate-change-
efforts.html?login=email&auth=login-email [https://perma.cc/9XKP-MUEZ]; 
Diana Ruiz, Palm Oil Commitments Broken: Global Brands Linked to Massive 
Deforestation, GREENPEACE (May 3, 2018),  https://www.greenpeace.org 
/usa/palm-oil-commitments-broken-global-brands-linked-massive-deforestation/ 
[https://perma.cc/2W3T-RWNG]. 
2. See EDWARD BURTYNSKY ET AL., ANTHROPOCENE  63, 71–73 (2018). Borneo 
is divided between Indonesia and Malaysia. While these photographs do not 
specify which portion of Borneo is depicted, massive deforestation to clear land 
for palm plantations has occurred in both geographical areas. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
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commodities linked to forest loss, and examines its effects in 
Indonesia, where the causal linkage between expanded demand for 
palm oil, conversion of forest areas to palm plantations, and the 
country’s GHG emissions has been particularly pronounced. This 
Article argues that an uncoordinated mosaic of multilateral, 
national, and corporate efforts has failed to prevent the adverse 
environmental and social results of expanding agricultural 
commodity production in Indonesia, as well as other tropical forest 
countries, largely because of conflicting economic and 
environmental objectives. 
Private legal systems to combat deforestation have been 
developed with the participation of commercial parties in 
agricultural supply chains, to compensate for ineffective public 
regulation and enforcement. Palm oil supply chains encompass a 
diverse set of actors, ranging from growers, refiners, traders, and 
manufacturers of products using palm oil or other commodities as 
an ingredient, to retailers of those products. Environmental 
advocacy groups, financial institutions, and downstream buyers 
have reacted to the severe environmental, social, economic, and 
political consequences of unsustainable production practices by 
demanding solutions from these actors.  Ratcheting up the 
pressure to act, these demands have been coupled with naming 
and shaming campaigns, investor divestment, and external 
scrutiny of direct or indirect responsibility for deforestation.  As a 
result, voluntary corporate “no deforestation” commitments have 
become more common. In addition, private certification bodies 
have been established to validate the sustainability of supply chain 
actors’ practices, in order to meet procurement standards, 
conditions to financing, or eligibility requirements under 
renewable energy regulations. While over time these private law 
systems have adopted stricter controls, the measures have been 
insufficient on their own to stop the loss of forest resources. 
Concurrently, pressure to adopt moratoria for preservation of 
forested land and to improve enforcement of existing legal 
restrictions is being exerted on exporting country governments by 
other states. At the same time, tropical forest countries’ national 
commitments under the United Nations member states’ Paris 
3
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Agreement3 have acknowledged the need to limit GHG emissions 
through controlling deforestation. Although control over land use 
and development of natural resources is recognized under 
principles of international law as a sovereign right,4 the adverse 
transboundary direct and indirect impacts of forest conversion 
have created conflicts with neighboring and distant countries. 
In the case of Indonesia, this conflict includes threats to leave 
the Paris Agreement, and to impose retaliatory trade restrictions5 
in reaction to the European Union’s (“EU”) recently announced 
restrictions on biofuels (“EU Biofuel Delegated Act”). These 
restrictions, contained in a Commission Delegated Regulation 
effective March 13, 2019, implement the EU’s December 2018 
revised Renewable Energy Directive (known as “RED II”)6 by 
imposing national limits on the amount of unsustainably produced 
biofuel that is eligible to count towards member states’ renewable 
energy targets, gradually reducing this amount to zero by 2030.7 
Under the criteria established by the EU Biofuel Delegated Act, if 
the production area of the biofuel crop has significantly expanded 
into carbon-rich areas such as forests, peatlands, or wetlands it is 
categorized as “High ILUC (Indirect Land Use Change) Risk 
 
3. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the 
Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev. (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter 
Paris Agreement]. 
4. For example, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
Principle 2: recognizing a State’s “sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.” U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, ¶2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 
(Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992). 
5. See Hans Nicholas Jong, Indonesia’s Threat to Exit Paris Accord Over 
Palm Oil Seen as Cynical Ploy, MONGABAY (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://news.mongabay.com/2019/04/indonesias-threat-to-exit-paris-accord-over-
palm-oil-seen-as-cynical-ploy/ [https://perma.cc/EKH8-5AK3]; Reuters, Indonesia 
Threatens to Quit Paris Climate Deal Over Palm Oil, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. 
NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019), http://news.trust.org/item/ 
20190327111002-yil0f [https://perma.cc/4KEA-AUFT]. 
6. European Commission Press Release MEMO/19/1656, Fact Sheet- 
Sustainability criteria for biofuels specified (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_19_1656 
[https://perma.cc/AWD6-M9YZ] [hereinafter Press Release MEMO/19/1656]. 
7. Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/807 of Mar. 13, 2019, Supplementing 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2019 O.J. (L 133) 1, 2. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
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Fuel.”8 Palm oil is currently the only biofuel source within the High 
ILUC Risk category.9 
Despite pressure on private and public actors, and some hints 
of progress bolstered by technology, success in halting 
deforestation has been elusive given the complex set of factors 
influencing this sector. Without effective coordination between the 
public and private legal systems, the “gold rush” arising from 
increasing global demand for palm oil will continue to drive 
expansion of production and resulting land use conversion at the 
expense of forest landscapes.10 
After defining key terms, this Article begins in Part II with a 
summary of the important contributions of forest resources, and 
the environmental and social impacts of their conversion to other 
land uses. Part III then examines the forces that have caused 
deforestation, focusing on the palm oil supply chain originating in 
Indonesia as a case study.  This example of expanded development 
at the expense of tropical forests reveals drivers that have also 
shaped other regions’ experiences with key agricultural 
commodities. 
Part IV outlines the public and private law principles and 
approaches that have emerged in response to these developments, 
as well as the challenges encountered that continue to frustrate 
meaningful progress. It also considers where the availability and 
exercise of leverage over the various public and private actors has 
influenced the evolution of this legal landscape. 
Finally, Part V reviews emerging trends affecting the 
Indonesian palm oil sector that could potentially contribute to a 
better outcome. This Article concludes by exploring how greater 
 
8. Press Release MEMO/19/1656, supra note 6 (describing High ILUC risk 
fuels as those produced with feed crops from high carbon stock areas such as 
forests, wetlands, and peatlands and the cumulative test used to identify these 
fuels). 
9. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
the Status of Production Expansion of Relevant Food and Feed Crops Worldwide, 
at 19, COM (2019) 142 final (Mar. 13, 2019) (concluding that of the nine biofuel 
feedstocks sources, palm oil qualifies as the only high ILUC-risk feedstock 
because of the level of GHG emissions associated with its production area) 
[hereinafter EC Biofuel Report]. 
10. Suzanna Dayne, Oil Palm Landscapes: Indonesia’s Game of Palms, 
FORESTS NEWS (Feb. 28, 2019), https://forestsnews.cifor.org/54814/oil-palm-
landscapes-indonesias-game-palms?fnl=en [https://perma.cc/H2Y3-K9FS]. 
5
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synergies between public and private legal initiatives to avoid 
deforestation could more effectively preserve these critical 
resources, if such efforts are not derailed by economic and political 
interests. Lessons derived from this ground-level view of palm oil’s 
expansion in Indonesia, including the need for more uniform 
governance approaches to controlling deforestation, can be applied 
more broadly to other regions and other agricultural commodities, 
so that vulnerable forest landscapes can be preserved for the 
future. 
II. WHAT IS DEFORESTATION AND WHY DOES IT 
MATTER? 
Before turning to an examination of the important 
environmental benefits of forest resources, and the consequences 
of their loss, a first step is to define the term “Deforestation.” This 
term has been defined in various ways, such as “when forests are 
converted to non-forest uses, such as agriculture and road 
construction,”11 “the direct human-induced conversion of forested 
land to non-forested land,”12 and “the conversion of forest to other 
land use independently whether human-induced or not.”13 Unlike 
“Deforestation,” the related concept of “Forest Degradation” 
occurs, even without such conversion of land use, “when forest 
ecosystems lose their capacity to provide important goods and 
services to people and nature.”14 To address concerns about a 
misalignment in forest-related definitions and a lack of guidance 
as to their application, the Accountability Framework initiative 
 
11. International Union for Conservation of Nature, Issues Brief: 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/deforestation-
forest_degradation_issues_brief_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MGC-HXXJ] 
[hereinafter Deforestation and Forest Degradation]. 
12. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conf. of the 
Parties on its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 
2001, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 11/CP.7 at 58 (2001). 
13. Global Forest Resource Assessment 2020: Terms and Definitions 6 (Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Working Paper No. 188, 
2018), http://www.fao.org/3/I8661EN/i8661en.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2JE-8NLU]. 
14. Deforestation and Forest Degradation, supra note 11. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
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(“AF”),15 which has formulated best practices for establishing, 
implementing, monitoring, and reporting on corporate pledges for 
sustainable agricultural and forestry supply chains, has 
consolidated these concepts. AF defines “Deforestation” as the 
following: a “[l]oss of natural forest as a result of: i) conversion to 
agriculture or other non-forest land use; ii) conversion to a tree 
plantation; or iii) severe and sustained degradation.”16 This 
definition encompasses forest loss even where permitted under 
applicable law—for example, through the issuance of licenses or 
concessions for the purpose of conversion to plantations. AF’s 
definition also does not count new plantings, which do not fully 
compensate for loss of carbon storage or biodiversity habitat, as an 
offset against destruction of primary forests unless they have 
regenerated to the point where the forest ecosystem “has attained 
species composition, structure, and ecological function similar to 
prior or other contemporary natural ecosystems.”17 Given the 
initiative’s focus on the adequacy of private and public law 
responses to deforestation, this Article will utilize AF’s 
comprehensive definition. 
Threats to forest resources have been the focus of ongoing 
international attention. The New York Declaration on Forests, a 
non-binding statement of principles that was adopted at the 
United Nation’s (“UN”) Climate Summit in September 2014 (“New 
York Declaration”)18 highlighted their significance: 
 
15. About the Accountability Framework Initiative, ACCOUNTABILITY 
FRAMEWORK, https://accountability-framework.org/the-initiative/ 
[https://perma.cc/5TGL-KAMD] [hereinafter Accountability Framework]. 
16. ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK, TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 3 (June 2019), 
https://accountability-framework.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Definitions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z5S8-L9Y6] (explaining that this definition pertains to a no-
deforestation supply chain commitment which focuses on preventing the 
conversion of natural forests). 
17. Id. at 5. 
18. U.N. Climate Summit, New York Declaration on Forests: Declaration and 
Action Agenda (Sept. 3, 2014), 
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and%20Energ
y/Forests/New% 
20York%20Declaration%20on%20Forests_DAA.pdf [https://perma.cc/PUZ7-
2492] [hereinafter New York Declaration on Forests] (describing that the 
Declaration has been endorsed by national and subnational governments as well 
as companies involved at all levels of agricultural commodity supply chains, 
financial institutions, not-for-profit entities, and indigenous peoples’ 
organizations). 
7
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Forests are essential to our future. More than 1.6 billion people 
depend on them for food, water, fuel, medicines, traditional 
cultures and livelihoods. Forests also support up to 80% of 
terrestrial biodiversity and play a vital role in safeguarding the 
climate by naturally sequestering carbon. Yet, each year an 
average of 13 million hectares [or 32 million acres] of forest 
disappear, often with devastating impacts on communities and 
indigenous peoples. The conversion of forests for the production of 
commodities—such as soy, palm oil, beef and paper—accounts for 
roughly half of global deforestation.19 
The Declaration targeted 2020 as the timeframe for eliminating 
deforestation caused by production of agricultural commodities, as 
well as 50% of deforestation from other causes, followed by total 
elimination globally by 2030.20 
Similarly, one of the objectives of the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (“SDGs”) adopted by member states in 201521 
is stated in Target 15.2: “[b]y 2020, promote the implementation of 
sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, 
restore degraded forests and substantially increase afforestation 
and reforestation globally.”22 More recently, a Declaration on 
Forests for the Climate (“Katowice Declaration”) was issued by UN 
member states recognizing that forests, which act as carbon sinks 
and reservoirs of GHGs, are essential for achieving the Paris 
Agreement goal of limiting global warming.23 Citing the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) Special 
Report on the impacts of additional warming of 1.5°C (“IPCC 
Special Report”), which identifies land use management as a 
 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (Oct. 21, 2015) (setting forth the SDGs, including Goal 
15 to “Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, 
sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land 
degradation and halt biodiversity loss.”). 
22. Id. at 24. 
23. U.N. Climate Change Conference, The Ministerial Katowice Declaration 
on Forests for the Climate (Dec. 2018), 
https://cop24.gov.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/Ministerial_Katowice_Declaration_on
_Forests_for_Climate_OFFICIAL_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3B4-MQB3] 
(referencing the 24th Conference of the Parties under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change held in Katowice, Poland from 
December 2–14, 2018) [hereinafter Katowice Declaration]. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
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critical method for carbon sequestration,24 the Katowice 
Declaration acknowledged: 
[T]he need for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, and forest conservation, sustainable management of 
forests, enhancement of forest carbon stocks, as well as alternative 
policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation 
approaches for the integral and sustainable management of 
forests, while addressing and respecting social and environmental 
safeguards and objectives.25 
Other international initiatives preceded these most recent 
calls for action, without a record of success. Pursuant to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), the 
REDD+ program (which stands for “reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation, plus the sustainable 
management of forests and the conservation and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks”26) was established by the UNFCCC in 2011.27 
This voluntary program proposes five climate change mitigation 
actions for developing countries to take in their forest sector, 
including the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, the conservation and sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of their carbon stocks.28 Such actions are 
to be taken by developing countries “in accordance with their 
respective capabilities and national circumstances” and to be 
monitored and reported by them “in the context of the provision of 
 
24. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Global 
Warming of 1.5C, 16–17 (2018), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_
Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQC2-BZMJ]. 
25. Katowice Declaration, supra note 23, at 2 (also emphasizing that forests 
provide additional important benefits including species habitat and biodiversity, 
as well as essential ecosystem services). 
26. What is REDD+, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., 
http://www.fao.org/sustainable-forest-management/toolbox/modules/redd/basic-
knowledge/en/ [https://perma.cc/SBU5-WRBY]. 
27. This was an outcome of the Cancun Agreements. U.N. Framework 
Convention Climate Change, Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties of its Sixteenth 
Session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2011). 
28. Id. at 12. 
9
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adequate and predictable support, including financial resources 
and technical and technological support . . . .”29 
Multiple environmental and social concerns, and a worsening 
trajectory, have led to these repeated multilateral 
acknowledgments of the need for action to preserve forest 
resources, particularly in tropical regions: 
Between 2000 and 2012, commercial agriculture accounted for an 
estimated 71% of global tropical deforestation, while illegal agro-
conversion was responsible for 24% of tropical forest loss. The 
links between commercial agriculture and deforestation are 
especially pronounced in Brazil and Indonesia, which collectively 
accounted for 38% of tropical deforestation in 2014.  Over the same 
time period, an estimated 90% of forest loss in Brazil was caused 
by commercial agriculture, primarily by conversion for beef and 
soy, while in Indonesia, an estimated 80% of forest loss was due to 
commercial agriculture, driven primarily by oil palm and pulp 
plantation expansion.30 
A sobering 2019 progress assessment on the New York 
Declaration’s “Action Agenda” found that its goal to halve natural 
forest loss globally by 2020 will not be met.31 In fact, global trends 
are worsening; since 2014, there has been a 44% increase in the 
annual rate of loss of tropical primary forests compared to the 
baseline period of 2002-13, and annual average GHG emissions 
from tropical forest loss exceed pre-2014 levels by 57%.32 This loss 
of forest cover can have drastic consequences in the context of 
climate change. The IPCC Special Report emphasized that 
minimizing deforestation will be necessary to limit the impacts of 
 
29. Id. 
30. BRIAN SCHAAP ET AL., COLLABORATION TOWARD ZERO DEFORESTATION: 
ALIGNING CORPORATE AND NATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN BRAZIL AND INDONESIA 10–
11 (2017), https://www.forest-trends.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/doc_5617.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8A4-3MMG]. 
31. See INGRID SCHULTE ET AL., PROTECTING AND RESTORING FORESTS: A STORY 
OF LARGE COMMITMENTS YET LIMITED PROGRESS 26–27 (Climate Focus ed., 2019), 
https://forestdeclaration.org/images/uploads/resource/ 
2019NYDFReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/GUG4-ADED]; see also PROGRESS ON THE 
NEW YORK DECLARATION ON FORESTS: GOAL 1 ASSESSMENT 1 (2019), 
https://forestdeclaration.org/images/uploads/resource/ 
2019NYDFGoal1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F76S-2HJN] [hereinafter PROGRESS  ON 
THE NEW YORK DECLARATION]. 
32. SCHULTE ET AL., supra note 31, at 28–29. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
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global warming, and the IPCC’s August, 2019 Special Report on 
Climate Change and Land affirmed with high confidence that 
reducing deforestation lowers GHG emissions.33 While intact 
forests function as carbon sinks, destruction of these natural 
resources results in added emissions of carbon and methane, 
powerful GHGs. As stated in the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature’s (“IUCN”) recent study of oil palm 
plantations as a cause of deforestation: 
Particularly large amounts [of carbon dioxide] are released when 
peat soils are drained during the land clearing and preparation 
phase, leading to decomposition or burning. Though palm oil 
plantations can maintain high rates of carbon uptake and their oil 
can potentially replace fossil fuels [as biofuel], it would take 
decades, to compensate for the carbon released when forests are 
cleared and peatlands drained.34 
Having described the impacts of deforestation from a global 
perspective, this Article will next examine palm oil production in 
Indonesia and its economic, environmental, and social 
consequences. 
III. PALM OIL AND DEFORESTATION IN 
INDONESIA 
Indonesia is one of the largest producers and exporters of palm 
oil, with planted areas representing approximately one-third of the 
world’s industrial scale plantations.35 In Indonesia, the bulk of 
palm oil growers have been located on a few islands, in Sumatra 
 
33. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Special Report on 
Climate Change, Desertification, Land Degradation, Sustainable Land 
Management, Food Security, and Greenhouse Gas Fluxes in Terrestrial 
Ecosystems, at 24–25 (Aug. 7, 
2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/08/Edited-
SPM_Approved_Microsite_ 
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AFJ-BQDV]; see also Katowice Declaration, supra 
note 23 (noting the important role of forests as GHG sinks). 
34. E. Meijaard et al., Oil Palm and Biodiversity, A Situation Analysis by the 
IUCN Palm Task Force, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE [IUCN], at 31 
(2018), https://portals.iucn.org/library/node/47753 [https://perma.cc/88ZT-
7WMX]. 
35. Id. at 6 (noting that Indonesia and Malaysia occupy approximately 32% 
of palm oil growth). 
11
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(Riau and Jambi provinces), various provinces in Kalimantan (also 
known as Indonesian Borneo), and more recently, Papua.36 The 
evolution of the palm oil sector in Indonesia illustrates how a 
complex set of interacting factors have influenced the expansion of 
a key agricultural commodity at the expense of forests. These 
factors include an increase in demand for palm oil exports, its 
international market price, and national factors such as 
population growth, local demand, government policies and 
enforcement, and economic needs.37 
Palm oil is used in a variety of products, ranging from food to 
personal care, and is used for cooking as well as biofuel. It is 
included in approximately half of all packaged supermarket foods 
and it accounts for 65% of all internationally traded vegetable oil.38 
While the largest producing countries are Indonesia and Malaysia, 
palm oil production has expanded into West Africa and Central 
and South America. Furthermore, forty-two thousand metric tons 
of palm oil are exported annually to more than seventy countries.39 
The majority of palm oil produced is exported to India, the EU 
countries, China, Japan, Pakistan, and the US.40  The European 
Commission has reported that in 2014 the energy sector used 60% 
of the palm oil imports, with 46% allocated to fuel for transport and 
15% to power and heat generation.41 The EU’s concern about the 
 
36. See id. at 54, 62; see also C.L. Illsley, Where Are Indonesia’s Palm Oil 
Plantations Located? WORLD ATLAS (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/where-are-indonesia-s-palm-oil-plantations-
located.html [https://perma.cc/75CY-WVJP]; see also STATISTICS INDONESIA (BPS), 
INDONESIAN PALM OIL GROWERS AND SMALLHOLDERS, PALM OIL PLANTATION AREA 
IN INDONESIA (2015), https://www.arcgis.com/apps/ 
MapSeries/index.html?appid=92fa3e0af2c148d68f276cf3ca63b1fb 
[https://perma.cc/UB4Y-PPB9] [hereinafter STATISTICS INDONESIA]. 
37. GABRIELLE KISSINGER ET AL., DRIVERS OF DEFORESTATION AND FOREST 
DEGRADATION: A SYNTHESIS REPORT FOR REDD+ POLICYMAKERS 5 (Lexeme 
Consulting ed., 2012), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65505/6316-drivers-
deforestation-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSY8-R7RF].  
38. Facts about Palm Oil, IUCN OIL PALM TASK FORCE, https://www.iucn-
optf.org/facts-about-palm-oil [https://perma.cc/Q398-D7FA] [hereinafter Facts 
about Palm Oil]. 
39. Id. 
40. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 11. 
41. European Parliament Resolution of 4 April, 2017 on Palm Oil and 
Deforestation of Rainforests, 2018 O.J. (C 298) 2, V [hereinafter European 
Parliament Resolution]. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
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significant forest loss historically associated with this commodity 
led it to take steps to limit the indirect land use change (and 
resulting GHG emissions and biodiversity destruction) caused by 
its demand for biofuel, as one element of a broader strategy to 
protect the world’s forests and encourage deforestation-free supply 
chains.42 
With regard to the palm oil supply chain, the process starts 
with fresh fruit bunches (“FFBs”) harvested from oil palm trees, a 
labor-intensive process.43 Growers range from industrial 
plantations, with thousands of hectares planted, to medium-scale 
operations and smallholder farms of less than 25 hectares, which 
are typically run as family farms.44 Some of these small and 
medium-size growers are independent while others sell their FFBs 
to larger growers, from land that they own or that may belong to 
the purchasing companies.45 After harvesting, the FFBs are 
transported to mills that produce crude palm oil, which are often 
owned by and located near the large plantations.46 The mills 
generate crude palm oil and kernel oil, which is then purchased by 
traders who sell the commodity to refineries in national and 
international markets.47 The refined product may be incorporated 
into manufactured products, and then distributed to retailers that 
sell these packaged goods to consumers, or used as biofuel.48  Palm 
oil coming from a variety of sources and produced under different 
environmental and social conditions may be processed and 
 
42. European Commission Press Release QANDA/19/4471, Questions and 
Answers - Communication on Forests (July 23, 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_19_4471 [https://
perma.cc/F8KY-YT79]. 
43. Meijaard et. al, supra note 34, at 8. 
44. Id. at 12–13. 
45. Id. at 12–14. 
46. Id. at 8; see Pablo Pacheco et al., The Palm Oil Global Value Chain: 
Implications for Economic Growth and Social and Environmental Sustainability 
15 (Ctr. for Int’l Forestry Research, Working Paper No. 220, 2017), 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP220Pacheco.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ETW8-KSR2]; see also Sarah Lake & Octavia Payne, Companies 
Can Now Spot Deforestation in their Palm Oil Supply Chains Before it Happens, 
GLOBAL FOREST WATCH (June 8, 2016), https://blog.globalforestwatch.org/ 
commodities/companies-can-now-spot-deforestation-in-their-palm-oil-supply-
chains-before-it-happens [https://perma.cc/N4DL-HWWE]. 
47. Pacheco et. al, supra note 46, at 13. 
48. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 8, 10 (providing also a graphic depiction 
of the palm oil supply chain). 
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commingled at the same mill or refinery, or combined when 
shipped, thereby adding to the difficulties of tracing the origin and 
sustainability of practices at various levels of the palm oil supply 
chain.49 
Palm oil is an important element of Indonesia’s economic 
development strategy, creating tensions with forest conservation 
objectives and policies: 
By 2045, Indonesia aspires to produce an estimated 60 million 
tonnes of Crude Palm Oil (CPO) annually . . . . In Indonesia, which 
currently supplies 61 percent (36 million tonnes) of the world’s 
palm oil, the rush to grow it poses grave dangers for the country’s 
forests and peat lands, which are being cleared for 
plantations . . . . Indonesian oil palm plantations are already 
being highly scrutinized by the global market and criticized for 
their unsustainable agricultural practices. In response, the 
government has pledged to . . . make 70 percent of palm oil 
sustainable by 2020 . . . [through policies] including zero-
deforestation and oil palm permit moratoria. Such actions, 
however, may have the effect of decreasing palm oil production.50 
A significant downside of this valuable commodity has been its 
adverse climate impact. While deforestation and forest 
degradation are estimated to account for 10-11% of total global 
GHG emissions,51 Indonesia itself has been responsible for the 
highest amount of GHG emissions from forest sources (with Brazil 
a close second).52 Indonesia also has been the largest emitter of 
 
49. See infra, Part V.B; see Eric F. Lambin et al., The Role of Supply-Chain 
Initiatives in Reducing Deforestation, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 109, 114 (2018); 
see also Pacheco et al., supra note 46, at 13 (noting that uptake of palm oil is 
highly fragmented). 
50. Shofia Saleh et al., Intensification by Smallholder Farmers is Key to 
Achieving Indonesia’s Palm Oil Targets, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Apr. 17, 
2018), https://www.wri.org/blog/2018/04/intensification-smallholder-farmers-
key-achieving-indonesia-s-palm-oil-targets [https://perma.cc/MJ29-WR8Y]. 
51. Salome Begeladze, How Do We Improve the Sustainability of Food 
Production Systems Without Clearing More Forests and Depleting Ecosystems?, 
IUCN (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.iucn.org/news/forests/201610/how-do-we-
improve-sustainability-food-production-systems-without-clearing-more-forests-
and-depleting-ecosystems [https://perma.cc/A6QV-5HF9]. 
52. Blanca Bernal et al., Global Forest GHG Emissions Database and Global 
FLR CO2 Removals Database Findings and Discussion, IUCN (2017), 
https://infoflr.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/global_emissions_and_removals_ 
databases_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SV9-9CAF]. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
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GHG emissions worldwide from the Land Use, Land Use Change, 
and Forestry (“LULUCF”) sector, and was responsible for over half 
of the total emissions from this category in 2014.53 Since the 
1990’s, a major source of these emissions has been the widespread 
and deliberate burning of peatlands, at times causing emissions in 
the region exceeding those from industry sources in  China or the 
United States.54  The European Commission Biofuel Report, which 
sets forth the rationale for the EU Biofuel Delegated Act’s 
sustainability criteria, reflected that during the period 2008 
through 2015, the percentage of global palm oil expansion into 
forest attributed to Indonesia averaged at 67% nationally, and in 
Indonesian Borneo, at 77%.55 In addition, it states that palm was 
the only biofuel feedstock with significant expansion into 
peatlands.56 Globally, palm oil caused the highest rate of carbon-
rich forest destruction over this period, with Indonesia’s palm oil 
production responsible for the most forest loss, and Malaysia, the 
second largest producer, in second place.57 
In its Nationally Determined Contribution (“NDC”) document 
submitted under the Paris Agreement detailing planned national 
actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change, Indonesia 
acknowledged the need to reduce its substantial carbon footprint. 
As such, it committed to reduce GHG emissions to 26% below 
 
53. SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 23–24. 
54.  Nicolas A. Robinson, For Peat’s Sake: Environmental Law Among the 
Bogs, in PROTECTING FOREST AND MARINE BIODIVERSITY: THE ROLE OF LAW 53, 56–
57 (Ed Couzens et al., eds., Edward Elgar Publ’g, 2017); see also Andres Chamorro 
et al., Exploring Indonesia’s Long and Complicated History of Forest Fires, WORLD 
RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.wri.org/blog/2017/02/exploring-indonesias-long-and-complicated-
history-forest-fires [https://perma.cc/US2K-B4E2] (concluding after a review of 
the history of Indonesia’s forest and peat fires that most have been human-
induced). 
55. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
on the Status of Production Expansion of Relevant Food and Feed Crops 
Worldwide, annexes, at 4, COM (2019) 142 final (Mar. 13, 2019) [hereinafter 
Annexes to EC Biofuel Report]. 
56. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
on the Status of Production Expansion of Relevant Food and Feed Crops 
Worldwide, cover note, at 10–11, COM (2019) 142 final (Mar. 15, 2019) 
[hereinafter Cover Note to EC Biofuel Report]. 
57. Id. at 8; Annexes to EC Biofuel Report, supra note 55, at 4–6. 
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Business as Usual (“BAU”) emissions levels58 by the year 2020, 
and 29% below such levels by 2030.59 Further reductions, to 41% 
below BAU by 2030, are contingent upon receipt of international 
support in the form of finance, technology transfer and 
development, and capacity building.60 Emissions from land use 
change (including deforestation for agriculture as well as peatland 
and forest fires) account for 63% of the country’s emissions 
profile.61 In its May, 2019 Emissions Reduction Program 
Document (“ERPD”) submitted under the REDD+ Program, the 
Indonesian government recognized that palm oil production has 
been a major contributor to these emissions.62 
Putting these figures in perspective, out of six major tropical 
forest countries, the Rainforest Foundation of Norway concluded 
that only Indonesia’s NDC provides for deforestation to be reduced 
from current levels.63 However, the resulting forest loss would still 
be significant, given the NDC emissions reduction target for the 
forestry sector of 217 million tons of carbon dioxide by 2030 (or as 
low as 64 million tonnes subject to receipt of international financial 
 
58. REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, FIRST NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION 
1–2, 7–8 (2016), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Indonesia%20Fir
st/First%20NDC%20Indonesia_submitted%20to%20UNFCCC%20Set_Novembe
r%20%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/22EH-MP7Y] [hereinafter INDONESIA NDC] 
(using projections from 2010 emission levels as the baseline for emissions 
reduction). 
59. Id. at 7. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 2. 
62. See Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Carbon Fund, Emission 
Reductions Program Document for East Kalimantan Jurisdictional Emission 
Reductions Program, Indonesia, at 63 (2019), 
https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/system/files/documents/ERPD_Indones
ia%20FINAL%20VERSION_MAY_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW5N-VV45] 
(noting that Indonesia’s palm oil sector has been criticized for being a leading 
contributor to GHG emissions) [hereinafter ERPD]. 
63. Rainforest Alliance Norway, Approaching the Point of No Return- 
Progression towards saving the world’s last remaining tropical forests through 
enhanced ambition in the Nationally Determined Contributions, at 4 (2018), 
https://d5i6is0eze552.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andrerapporter/R
F_Point_of_no_return_1218_web.pdf?mtime=20181203131631 
[https://perma.cc/AF8C-N9SX] [hereinafter Approaching the Point of No Return] 
(The six countries whose NDCs were reviewed are Brazil, Indonesia, The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Peru, Myanmar, and Colombia). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
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support).64 While this would represent a reduction of at least 66% 
from 2010 levels, “[it] still means that 3.25 million hectares of 
forest, the size of Belgium, will be deforested by 2030 even when 
reaching the NDC target.”65 
Tropical forest conversion to oil palm plantations has also 
been responsible for reducing the country’s biodiversity, impairing 
ecological services, and causing air and water pollution due to 
forest clearing and peat bog fires. The principal impact on wildlife 
has been habitat loss after forest clearing and burning. However, 
once the more diverse forest landscapes are replaced with palm 
plantations, species diversity also suffers significantly.66 
Orangutans, gibbons, tigers, and other forest species have been 
particularly vulnerable.67 Clearing for pulp and paper plantations, 
fire-induced deforestation, small-scale agriculture, and hunting 
has also played a role.68 While globally palm oil production is 
affecting at least 193 threatened species,69 the IUCN has 
concluded that “[o]ver the last four decades, species have slid 
towards extinction twice as fast in Indonesia as in any other 
country, at least in part as a result of forest conversion for oil palm 
production.”70 
Air pollution from uncontrolled peat fires and the use of fire 
for land clearing has extended well beyond Indonesia’s borders, 
causing international outcry. Rampant fires in Indonesia’s regions 
of palm oil and timber production have been responsible for 
destroying huge areas of forest and burning peatlands.71 These 
fires caused a health crisis by generating hazardous smog that 
cloaked skies as far as Singapore.72 Although the Southeast Asian 
 
64. Id.; see INDONESIA NDC, supra note 58, at 9. 
65. Approaching the Point of No Return, supra note 63, at 4. 
66. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 19, 24. 
67. Id. at 24. 
68. Id. at 27. 
69. Deforestation and Forest Degradation, supra note 11. 
70. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 24. 
71. Robinson, supra note 54, at 79–80; see also ERPD, supra note 62, at 52 
(discussing the negative attention directed at Indonesia for the severe and large-
scale fires in the region). 
72. Michael Taylor, As Fires Burn, Can Indonesia Avoid Repeat of 2015 Haze 
Crisis, THOMPSON REUTERS FOUND. NEWS (Aug. 5, 2019), 
http://news.trust.org/item/20190805095507-0uj91/ [https://perma.cc/HK6F-
ZKP4]. 
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Nations (“ASEAN”) signed a Transboundary Haze Agreement in 
2002, Indonesia was the last to ratify it in 2014, in the aftermath 
of regional protest over the prior year’s raging fires.73 Yet in 2015 
alone, exacerbated by the effects of El Niño, an estimated 2.6 
million hectares (6.4 million acres) of land burned, and was 
responsible for over US$16 billion in property damage and 
economic loss.74 
Other drivers of deforestation are linked to local communities. 
Nationally, while large palm oil estates account for about half of 
the country’s production of this commodity, a significant 35-40% of 
production comes from smallholdings.75 These farmers face 
multiple economic constraints which have led them to encroach on 
forest lands, including pressure from population increase,76 a lack 
of alternative income sources, significantly lower yields than large 
estates, and limited access to technology and finance.77 
In addition, commercial-scale production has been associated 
with unfair land grabs, displacing local populations that may lack 
ownership rights but historically have had access to forest 
 
73. Robinson, supra note 54, at 81 n.126; see Indonesia Moves to Stop Forest 
Fire Pollution as Haze Grips Singapore, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/16/indonesia-forest-fire-
pollution-haze-singapore-palm-oil [https://perma.cc/6Y8N-6NP5]; see also Status 
of Ratification of Transboundary Haze Pollution Agreement, ASS’N OF SE. ASIAN 
NATIONS [ASEAN] HAZE ACTION ONLINE, http://haze.asean.org/status-of-
ratification/ [https://perma.cc/Y66T-QR3R]. 
74. SCHAAP, supra note 30, at 25–26; Andres Chamorro et al., supra note 54; 
see Matt Osborn, et al., Indonesia Forest Fires: How the Year’s Worst 
Environmental Disaster Unfolded – Interactive, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-
interactive/2015/dec/01/indonesia-forest-fires-how-the-years-worst-
environmental-disaster-unfolded-interactive [https://perma.cc/L44Z-GUP3] 
(providing an interactive depiction constructed from NASA satellite images 
showing a disproportionate concentration of fires in areas of Sumatra and 
Indonesian Borneo devoted to production of palm oil and forest products). 
75. See Meijaard et. al., supra note 34, at 13 (noting 40%); see also ERPD, 
supra note 62, at 63 (noting 35%). 
76. ERPD, supra note 62, at 66, 72; see INDONESIA NDC, supra note 58, at 8; 
see also U.N. Dept. of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population 
Prospects- Data Booklet, at 17 (2019), https://population.un.org/wpp/ 
Publications/Files/WPP2019_DataBooklet.pdf [hereinafter World Population 
Prospects] [https://perma.cc/N7RM-RGNM] (noting that Indonesia is the world’s 
fourth most populous country, with 271 million people in 2019, and is expected to 
attain almost 300 million by 2030); see also id. at 12 fig. 12 (illustrating 
population growth projections for 1990-2020 and 2020-2100). 
77. ERPD, supra note 62, at 73. 
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resources to supplement their incomes.78 The Indonesian 
government has acknowledged that past failures to provide formal 
land tenure rights have been an impediment to good forest 
management and have led to conflict with other land users.79 In 
many tropical and subtropical countries, this problem has plagued 
indigenous peoples and local communities, who manage lands 
acting as sinks of nearly 300,000 million metric tons of carbon, but 
often lack formal legal recognition of ownership.80 
Notwithstanding this litany of environmental damage and 
social harm, palm oil is a valuable and productive resource that 
can, if properly managed, provide benefits as a result of its 
potential for efficient land use. As characterized by the IUCN, the 
debate over palm oil is not simple: 
Many in the conservation community dislike oil palm cultivation 
because of its negative biodiversity impacts, even though this is a 
feature of many agricultural commodities . . . the relationship 
between the two [palm oil and biodiversity] is complicated. A ban 
on palm oil . . . could have overall negative biodiversity impacts, 
if . . . demand . . . was . . . satisfied by conversion of biodiverse 
ecosystems for cultivation of alternatives more land-hungry than 
oil palm, such as soy. Similarly, yield increases in palm oil could 
mean that the same amount of oil is produced on less land, thus 
benefiting biodiversity, but it could also make palm oil even more 
competitive compared to other crops, increasing palm oil 
expansion at the expense of other lower yield crops. This would 
demand stricter control on expansion than currently seems 
possible.81 
As part of its ERPD submission to the World Bank under the 
REDD+ program in May 2019, the Indonesian government 
analyzed the drivers and underlying causes of deforestation and 
forest degradation in East Kalimantan, Indonesia’s third largest 
 
78. Facts about Palm Oil, supra note 38. 
79. ERPD, supra note 62, at 73. 
80. N.Y. DECLARATION ON FORESTS PROGRESS ASSESSMENT, 2018 SUMMARY OF 
PROGRESS ON THE NEW YORK DECLARATION ON FORESTS 1 (2018), 
https://forestdeclaration.org/images/uploads/resource/2018_NYDF_Goals1-
10_UpdatesSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/84GF-KPTT] [hereinafter 2018 
SUMMARY]. 
81. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 83. 
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province, and one of the principal sites of oil palm plantations.82 
The ERPD cites rapid expansion of the industry due to “growing 
demand for palm oil as cheap cooking oil especially from China and 
India, and increasingly as a [source of] biofuel” as drivers of forest 
conversion.83 After expansion of large oil palm estates on Sumatra 
has largely exhausted available land, new development is taking 
place in Kalimantan and Papua.84 In East Kalimantan, up to 51% 
of deforestation occurring between 2006 and 2016 was related to 
the development of oil palm.85 The ERPD acknowledges that 
further expansion of oil palm is likely to occur at the expense of 
forests, whether or not conversion is permitted under a 
government license.86 
The next section of this Article will focus on the public and 
private legal developments that have evolved over time in response 
to the historical failure to manage palm oil’s adverse impacts. 
IV. ADDRESSING DEFORESTATION: THE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE 
In reaction to this unsustainable path of palm oil production, 
and influence exerted by external forces, separate sets of 
governance measures have been implemented by governmental 
and private actors. Although they share a common stated 
objective—stopping deforestation—these systems have developed 
different approaches that have, at times, been in conflict. 
Examining the history of how and why these “public law” and 
“private law”87 mechanisms have formed, and the barriers to their 
implementation, will help to identify more effective strategies 
going forward. 
 
82. ERPD, supra note 62, at 63 (identifying Sumatra and, more recently, 
Kalimantan and Papua, as the major regions for plantation estate development); 
see STATISTICS INDONESIA, supra note 36 (providing details on palm oil plantation 
area by province for each such region, with the largest located in Sumatra’s Riau 
province). 
83. ERPD, supra note 62, at 64. 
84. ERPD, supra note 62, at 63. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 63–64. 
87. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Ben Raker, Private Governance and the 
New Private Advocacy 45 (Vanderbilt Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 18-50, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3235445 [https://perma.cc/RU8M-G2F2]. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
 2019] SEEING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES 21 
The traditional “command and control” approach to 
prescriptive regulation88 has been utilized by the Indonesian 
government through imposition of a moratorium on the issuance 
of new permits for the conversion of primary natural forest and 
peatland to agricultural use.89 The government also grants 
licenses for concessions, creating property rights to develop land 
for palm oil under specified conditions.90 Concurrently, private 
authorities have been formed, such as the Roundtable for 
Sustainable Palm Oil (“RSPO”), to establish standards that palm 
oil growers must meet to qualify for certification as a sustainable 
producer.91 These standards include limits on, or prohibition of, 
forest clearing practices and planting on peatland areas.92 
Separately, the Indonesian government has established its own set 
of certification standards under the Indonesia Sustainable Palm 
Oil scheme.93 Other actors in the supply chain (e.g., traders, 
manufacturers and retailers) have committed to voluntary 
standards, with different degrees of specificity and transparency, 
in order to avoid deforestation in their own operations, as well as 
to impose restrictions on their suppliers through contractual 
provisions or procurement standards.94 
These moratoria, licensing regimes, certification standards, 
and commitments have each become more stringent, influenced by 
 
88. James Salzman, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental 
Law: The Five P’s, 
23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 364–65 (2013) (borrowing a conceptual 
framework, governance mechanisms can be categorized by reference to the five 
“Ps” including Prescriptive Regulation, Property Rights, Penalties, Payments, 
and Persuasion). 
89. Pacheco et al., supra note 46, at 30. 
90. See id. at 14 (including a map of oil palm concessions in Indonesia, while 
highlighting the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on licensees and allocated 
land); see also ERPD, supra note 62, at 101 (outlining the licensing regime for 
forested land and required approvals); SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 26 (citing 
problematic conditions of the concession regime that conflict with conservation 
objectives). 
91. See infra Part IV B.2.; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private 
Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 152 (2013) (listing the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil as an example of a formed commodity 
roundtable for palm oil). 
92. See infra Part IV B.2. 
93. See infra Part IV A; see also Pacheco et al., supra note 46, at 29 
(discussing the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil standard). 
94. See infra Part IV B.1. 
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the exercise of leverage by external stakeholders including non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”), lenders, other countries, 
and international governance bodies. However, along the way, 
different objectives and motivations of these public and private 
actors have limited the reach of these governance mechanisms. 
Inconsistency and lack of coordination affecting the restrictions 
applied, the standards of conduct agreed to, and standards for 
enforcement, have impaired the effectiveness of these overlapping 
approaches to halting deforestation. 
A. Public Law Mechanisms 
Despite many attempts to create a comprehensive, legally 
binding international instrument, the fate of forests has been 
caught up in political divisions between developing and developed 
countries.95  Developed countries have sought binding 
commitments to preserve tropical forests, recognizing their critical 
function as carbon sinks needed to mitigate climate change.96 
However, tropical forest nations have pushed back, asserting 
sovereign rights to manage their natural resources and prioritize 
economic development.97 Non-binding declarations and principles 
have tried to fill this gap in international governance.98 Multiple 
 
95. PAMELA S. CHASEK ET AL., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 215 
(Westview Press, 7th ed. 2017). 
96. See, e.g., Constance Haug & Joyeeta Gupta, Global Forest Governance, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE, FORESTS AND REDD, LESSONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 52, 
55 (Joyeeta Gupta et al., 2013); see also, William Boyd, Ways of Seeing 
Environmental Law: How Deforestation Became an Object of Climate Governance, 
37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 843, 865 (2010) (discussing the conflicts arising over trying to 
develop an international legal instrument for forests). 
97. Joyeeta Gupta et al., supra note 96, at 55; see 16 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS 
BULLETIN, SUMMARY OF THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
ENVIRONMENT ASSEMBLY 153 (2019), https://enb.iisd.org/vol16/enb16153e.html 
[https://perma.cc/GU4Q-K3EP] (noting that at the March 2019 United Nations 
Environmental Assembly, developing countries objected to the EU’s resolution 
addressing the linkage between agricultural commodity production and 
deforestation ‘as a direct attack on their most important commodity exports’); see 
also Ed Couzens et. al., Legal Aspects of the Protection of Forest and Marine 
Biodiversity: Understanding the Context, in PROTECTING FOREST AND MARINE 
BIODIVERSITY: THE ROLE OF LAW 3, 15–16 (Ed Couzens et al., eds., Edward Elgar 
Publ’g, 2017). 
98. See e.g., G.A. Res. 62/98, Non- legally Binding Instrument on All Types 
of Forests (Dec. 17, 2007); Economic and Social Counc. Res. 2017/4 (Apr. 20, 2014), 
adopting U.N. Strategic Plan for Forests 2017–2030; U.N. Secretary-General, 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
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international fora have attempted to tackle forest loss, including 
the UN Forum on Forests established in 2000 by the UN Economic 
and Social Council (“ECOSOC).”99 The Forum’s 2017 session led to 
the General Assembly’s adoption of the Strategic Plan for 
Forests.100 As described by ECOSOC, the “voluntary and 
universal” Strategic Plan “provides a global framework for actions 
at all levels to sustainably manage all types of forests and trees 
outside forests and halt deforestation and forest degradation.”101 
It sets six Global Forest Goals and twenty-six associated targets to 
be achieved by 2030, including to “[r]everse the loss of forest cover 
worldwide through [sustainable forest management], including 
protection, restoration, afforestation and reforestation, and 
increase efforts to prevent forest degradation and contribute to the 
global effort of addressing climate change.”102 The Strategic Plan 
is intended as a “framework for forest-related contributions” to the 
SDGs, the Paris Agreement, and numerous multilateral 
environmental agreements that regulate aspects of forest 
ecological systems,103 including biodiversity, wetlands, and 
endangered species. 
In the absence of a comprehensive international legal regime, 
the principal public governance mechanism for the management of 
forest resources has been through the use of national or 
subnational land use regulation.104 This fundamental 
governmental tool can be used as a license to promote economic 
activity or as a means to restrict its impacts. However, influential 
political, and commercial interests, as well as development-
 
Gaps in International Environmental Law and Environment-related Instruments: 
Towards a Global Pact for the Environment, U.N. Doc. A/73/419 (Nov. 30, 2018); 
G.A. Res. 70/1, Goal 15, supra note 21; New York Declaration on Forests, supra 
note 18; Katowice Declaration, supra note 23. 
99. See Couzens et. al., supra note 97, at 15 (noting the international fora 
tasked with creating forestry instruments); see also CHASEK, supra note 95, at 
219–223 (discussing the ECOSOC’s development). 
100. G.A. Res. 71/285, United Nations Strategic Plan for Forests 2017–2030 
(Apr. 27, 2017); U.N. Forum on Forests, United Nations Strategic Plan for Forests, 
2017-2030 (Jan. 2017). 
101. Economic and Social Council Res. 2017/4, at 2, 5 (July 7, 2017). 
102. Id. at 6. 
103. Id. at 2; see also Couzens et. al., supra note 97, at 15–16. 
104. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 62/98, supra note 98 at 2–3 (providing that “Each 
State is responsible for the sustainable management of its forests and for the 
enforcement of its forest-related laws.”). 
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oriented policies, have often outweighed environmental objectives. 
Additionally, regulatory measures can prove ineffective due to a 
lack of capacity or willingness to enforce.105 Indonesia’s efforts to 
regulate its forest sector illustrate many of these elements, as well 
as how external forces can prove an influential counterweight. 
Commencing in the 1970’s, Indonesia enacted national 
environmental laws to address land use, spatial planning, and 
forest management, which included a prohibition on burning of 
land for clearing.106 Unfortunately, the institutional capacity to 
enforce those laws did not keep up with the rapid expansion of pulp 
and palm oil plantations in the 1990’s.107 Moreover, corruption and 
collusion have influenced the granting of oil palm development 
permits.108  Despite regulatory efforts over the subsequent 
decades, both legal and illegal destruction of forests and peatlands 
has continued.109 Across Borneo alone, fire, illegal logging, and the 
expansion of palm oil and pulpwood plantations led to a loss of 50% 
of its tropical forest cover since the mid-1980s.110 
 
105. ERPD, supra note 62, at 101–102 (citing issues with inadequate 
enforcement of land use and licensing regimes, in part due to a lack of capacity); 
Vandenbergh, supra note 91, at 161 (noting the failure of public governance, one 
impetus for development of private law solutions, can arise from inadequate 
capacity to enforce); see, e.g., Economic and Social Counc. Res. 2017/04, supra note 
98 (citing poor coordination among different levels of government in planning and 
enforcement as a challenge to forest protection). 
106. Robinson, supra note 54, at 78–79 (discussing the efforts implemented 
by the Indonesian government after severe forest fires); see ERPD, supra note 62, 
at 74. 
107. Robinson, supra note 54, at 81. 
108. Id. at 81; Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 15, 22 (providing an example 
of the local government’s issuance of permits to develop the Tripa peat swamp for 
palm oil, despite the area’s protected status under Indonesian law and importance 
as a wildlife habitat). 
109. International Finance Corporation, Global Map of Environmental and 
Social Risks in Agro-Commodity Production, Indonesia Oil Palm 
[https://perma.cc/KG2M-RWX7] [hereinafter GMAP Indonesia Oil Palm] 
(discussing illegal oil palm production in national parks and IUCN protected 
areas including the Sumatra’s Leuser Ecosystem, which is home to several 
endangered species); see also Genevieve Bennett, Companies Acting on 
Deforestation, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/companies-acting-on-
deforestation-have-a-legality-issue/ [https://perma.cc/M9FM-H2CV] (noting that 
a demand for palm oil was a contributing factor to forest destruction). 
110. U.N. Environment Programme, Deforestation in Borneo is Slowing, but 
Regulation Remains Key (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.unenvironment.org/news-
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The Indonesian government sought to enhance forest 
governance in 2011 by imposing a national moratorium on 
conversion of primary forest areas (the “Primary Forest 
Moratorium” or “Moratorium”).111 This Moratorium has attempted 
to address the adverse environmental impacts of oil palm 
development by “prohibiting the allocation of new oil palm leases” 
in previously undeveloped forests and the vast majority of peat 
areas.112 It was instituted in connection with the UNFCCC’s 
REDD+ program to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, as a step toward receipt of an anticipated $1 billion 
in funding from Norway after Indonesia’s completion of the 
program’s “readiness phase.”113 The Primary Forest Moratorium 
has been extended several times,114 and has now been declared 
permanent by President Joko Widodo.115  The national 
government also established the One Map initiative, with the aim 
of creating a map of land use agreed upon by all ministries, as well 
as other regulations aimed at land use planning and the protection 
and restoration of peatland.116 Although there has been reduction 
in the rate of deforestation since 2016, largely due to imposition of 
a moratorium on peatland conversion,117 these measures have not 
proven sufficient to stop continued land conversion for palm 
 
and-stories/story/deforestation-borneo-slowing-regulation-remains-key 
[https://perma.cc/2UH3-DDJX] [hereinafter Deforestation in Borneo]. 
111. Id.; see SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 24 (noting that Indonesia’s two-
year moratorium was an attempt to support forest conservation). 
112. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 50. 
113. Pacheco et. al., supra note 46, at 30. 
114. Deforestation in Borneo, supra note 110; see SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 
30, at 25. 
115. Reuters, Indonesia President Makes Moratorium on Forest Clearance 
Permanent, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. NEWS (Aug. 8, 2019), 
http://news.trust.org/item/20190808091653-84pgm/ [https://perma.cc/TS4Z-
TU5W]. 
116. INDONESIAN MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, LOW 
CARBON DEVELOPMENT: A PARADIGM SHIFT TOWARDS A GREEN ECONOMY IN 
INDONESIA 81–82 (Mar. 2019), https://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/ 
sites/default/files/downloads/policy-
database/indonesia_lowcarbon_development_full%20report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S9UE-BZBK] [hereinafter LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT]; see 
ERPD, supra note 62, at 103. 
117. Hans Nicholas Jong, Indonesia Ban on Clearing New Swaths of Forest 
to be Made Permanent, MONGABAY (June 10, 2019), 
https://news.mongabay.com/2019/06/indonesian-ban-on-clearing-new-swaths-of-
forest-to-be-made-permanent/ [https://perma.cc/H483-3UR2]. 
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plantations, or to prevent the devastating fires in peat forests that 
led to international opprobrium.118  Multiple challenges have 
impaired the effectiveness of the Primary Forest Moratorium, 
including inadequate capacity of the national government to 
provide training on how to apply the ban and oversee its local 
administration.119 In addition, the door remained open to 
unsustainable development through exemptions for previously 
cleared and replanted or regrown “secondary forest,” as well as 
exceptions for “national development” projects which can 
encompass agricultural activities.120 Significantly, the 
Moratorium did not cover existing concessions.121 As such, there is 
skepticism that merely instituting the Moratorium permanently 
will be sufficient to reduce deforestation given the scope of 
exceptions to its coverage, and questions about how permissively 
local officials have applied them.122 
Indonesia also instituted a national mandatory certification 
scheme in 2011, the Indonesia Sustainable Palm Oil (“ISPO”) 
program. The program’s objective is to “improve the sustainability 
and competitiveness of the Indonesian palm oil industry, whilst 
contributing to the Indonesian government’s commitments to 
reducing [GHG] emissions.”123  Although ISPO certification of all 
producers is mandatory, different requirements apply to 
smallholder farmers, who may participate on a voluntary basis 
until 2022.124 Yet this certification scheme, while restricting forest 
clearance within protected areas or areas subject to the Primary 
Forest Moratorium, still allows clearing outside these areas if 
growers receive the required permits from the Ministry of 
 
118. See Taylor, supra note 72; see also Robinson, supra note 54, at 79, 83 
(discussing Indonesia’s efforts to enact measures to combat forest fires). 
119. SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 24. 
120. Id. at 24; Hans Nicholas Jong, Indonesia Forest-Clearing Ban is Made 
Permanent, but Labeled ‘Propaganda’, MONGABAY (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://news.mongabay.com/2019/08/indonesia-forest-clearing-ban-is-made-
permanent-but-labeled-propaganda/ [https://perma.cc/EX84-JVKR] (explaining 
that the exception encourages the deliberate clearing of primary forests to 
transform them into exempt secondary forests). 
121. SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 24. 
122. Jong, supra note 120. 
123. ERPD, supra note 62, at 109. 
124. Id. 
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Forestry.125 Although it requires producers to comply with 
national and regional legal requirements, only a small minority of 
plantations participate, and violators haven’t faced 
consequences.126  In addition, while “[ISPO] criteria also require 
protection of riparian forests (to control erosion processes) and 
peatland areas (with >3 m depth), and contain[s] provisions 
against the conversion of areas of conservation importance . . . the 
criteria do not provide clear definitions and frameworks to identify 
these areas.”127 
Implementation of public governance measures has been 
ineffective, hampered by lack of coordination within different 
ministries and levels of government, the influence of commercial 
interest groups, and the need to fund other programs with revenue 
from issuance of concession permits.128 Notably, the Indonesian 
Government’s 2019 REDD+ submission contains the following 
critical self-assessment: 
Poor governance and weak law enforcement also afflict the 
licensing regime. Some licenses are issued without the proper 
administrative processes; some businesses, especially in the palm 
oil and mining sectors, operate without the required licenses; and 
many license holders do not follow regulations that are meant to 
ensure positive environmental and social outcomes. The spatial 
 
125. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 50; see also Hans Nicholas Jong, 
Indonesian Minister Blasted Over Palm Permit for Graft-Tainted Concession, 
MONGABAY (Feb. 22, 2019), https://news.mongabay.com/2019/02/indonesian-
minister-blasted-over-palm-permit-for-graft-tainted-concession/ 
[https://perma.cc/5A8Z-PDG9] (discussing the continuing controversy over the 
issuance of permits for rainforest conversion based on grandfathered concessions 
by the Ministry of Forestry). 
126. Environmental Investigation Agency, Promises in Practice- The Limited 
Reliability of Voluntary “No Deforestation” Commitments in Papua’s Palm Oil 
Plantations, 11 (2019), https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-
report-Promises-in-practice-spreads.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VDP-Z5M2] 
[hereinafter EIA]. 
127. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 50; see also Backtracking on Reform: 
How Indonesia’s Government is Weakening its Palm Oil Standards, EIA (Feb. 8, 
2018), https://eia-international.org/news/backtracking-reform-indonesias-
government-weakening-palm-oil-standards/ [https://perma.cc/AZJ7-NK4Z] 
(discussing the continuing controversy over issuance of a permit by the Ministry 
of Forestry to develop a grandfathered forest concession, despite a history of 
illegal deforestation by the licensee and conviction of its owner for having bribed 
local officials) [hereinafter EIA, Backtracking on Reform]. 
128. Pacheco et al., supra note 46, at 30. 
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analysis carried out for this assessment, confirms that land use 
plans, including forest zone maps, often don’t match the reality on 
the ground. For example, within the State Forest Area boundaries 
there are 136,793 [hectares] of oil palm plantations . . . located 
within the conservation forest zone . . . . The [national 
government] has in recent years undertaken serious efforts to 
improve land governance, including law enforcement. These 
include the establishment of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission . . . which has a broad mandate that includes 
investigating a number of land-based sectors, including the 
mining, forestry and estate crops sectors; the launch of the One 
Map policy, which seeks to create a unified map; several critical 
Constitutional Court decisions relating to land rights and the 
delineation of the State Forest Area; efforts to create local 
institutions . . . to oversee management of forest areas; and 
clarifications in the administrative arrangements for land 
management. It should be noted, however, that some of these 
efforts imply fundamental regulatory and administrative shifts 
which will take [a] long time to implement . . . .129 
International efforts to reduce GHG emissions and to address 
deforestation have influenced recent national government 
strategy. Indonesia’s NDC recognizes that decarbonization efforts 
must be integrated in its development planning,130 and that 
coordination is necessary among national ministries and with 
provincial governments.131 According to a 2017 analysis, in 
Sumatra alone, the site of 70% of Indonesia’s plantations, 
“[a]ddressing deforestation, peatland degradation, and wildfires 
related to palm oil production. . .is. . . of critical importance to the 
country’s NDC commitments.”132 The Paris Agreement 
requirements for mandatory reporting of progress in emissions 
reductions against NDC targets, and the desire to avoid 
international criticism, should act as an incentive to tip the 
balance of national priorities towards forest conservation and to 
 
129. ERPD, supra note 62, at 103. 
130. INDONESIA NDC, supra note 58, at 8. 
131. Id. at 6 (noting the establishment of a new Directorate General of 
Climate Change under the Indonesian Ministry of Environment and Forestry to 
act as the central liaison to the UNFCCC and oversee the implementation of 
emissions reductions programs). 
132. SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 31. 
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dedicate resources to enforcement.133 Yet, based on its previous 
history of ineffective implementation, it is unclear whether the 
approaches Indonesia has specified to attain these reductions in 
emissions (i.e., land use controls, spatial planning, and sustainable 
forest management) will be sufficient to achieve its 2020 reduction 
target.134 
The recent evolution of public governance measures towards 
increased stringency are also directly linked to Indonesia’s multi-
year efforts to qualify for financing under the REDD+ program. In 
2016, the national government issued a new moratorium on 
peatland conversion.135 In addition to freezing issuance of new 
licenses for oil palm plantations for three years, in September 
2018, the Indonesian President ordered central government 
ministries and regional governments to review existing oil palm 
licenses.136 These developments, together with a decline in the rate 
of deforestation in 2017, have only recently resulted in 
acknowledgement that the first payment will be made under the 
2010 $1 billion REDD+ funding agreement between Norway and 
Indonesia.137 Additional conditions to funding include, 
establishing an agreed upon mechanism for measuring emissions 
reductions and continued progress on emissions reductions.138 
 
133. See Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at 28–29 (Art. 13.7). 
134. Robinson, supra note 54, at 88. 
135. Deforestation in Borneo, supra note 110. 
136. Hans Nicholas Jong, Indonesian President Signs 3-Year Freeze on New 
Oil Palm Licenses, MONGABAY (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://news.mongabay.com/2018/09/indonesian-president-signs-3-year-freeze-
on-new-oil-palm-licenses/ [https://perma.cc/Z34K-7STC]. 
137. Letter of Intent on Cooperation on Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, Indon.-Nor., May 26, 2010; See Hans 
Nicholas Jong, Indonesia to Get First Payment from Norway Under $1b REDD+ 
Scheme, MONGABAY (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://news.mongabay.com/2019/02/indonesia-to-get-first-payment-from-
norway-under-1b-redd-scheme/?utm_source=REDD%2B+Resource+-
+March+2019&utm_campaign=Dec+2018-+Feb+2019+UN-
REDD+newsletter&utm_medium=email [https://perma.cc/F8DX-KUCB]. 
138. Jong, supra note 137; see also Michael Taylor, Norway Starts Payments 
to Indonesia for Cutting Forest Emissions, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2019), 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/indonesia-climatechange-forests/norway-starts-
payments-to-indonesia-for-cutting-forest-emissions-idUKL5N20D1NS 
[https://perma.cc/QB55-B65E] (explaining that once the level of decline in 
Indonesia’s deforestation-related carbon emissions is independently verified, 
Norway will pay Indonesia for 4.8 million tonnes of avoided emissions). 
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The reduction in Indonesia’s carbon emissions in 2017, as well 
as reports of a continued reduction in the amount of forest loss in 
2018,139 has provided some reason for hope that the government’s 
actions are beginning to influence a change in land use 
practices.140 For example, a study of industrial plantations in 
Borneo noted that climatic conditions in 2017 were more favorable, 
as the absence of El Niño that year improved rainfall.141 A 
decrease in fires may also be attributable to public education 
campaigns and the enforcement of recently instituted 
restrictions.142 In addition, there is evidence that this represents a 
trend of slowing plantation expansion and related forest 
conversion since 2012.143 External factors may also have played a 
role, including a decline in palm oil prices and a shift to planting 
in other geographical areas, both within and outside of 
Indonesia.144 However, the return of El Niño conditions in 2019 
and ineffective restoration of previously drained carbon-
sequestering peatlands contributed to a significant resurgence of 
fires in Indonesia, with hazardous smoke conditions that exceeded 
2014 levels.145 Indonesia’s resulting emissions were reported to be 
almost twice the amount released from fires in the Brazilian 
Amazon during the same period.146 
 
139. SCHULTE ET AL., supra note 31, at 29; Arief Wijaya et al., Indonesia Is 
Reducing Deforestation, but Problem Areas Remain, GLOBAL FOREST WATCH (July 
24, 2019), https://blog.globalforestwatch.org/data-and-research/indonesia-is-
reducing-deforestation-but-problem-areas-remain [https://perma.cc/N93D-
5K8D]. 
140. SCHULTE ET AL., supra note 31, at 29; see also Wijaya et al., supra note 
139. 
141. David L.A. Gaveau et al., Rise and Fall of Forest Loss and Industrial 
Plantations in Borneo (2000-2017), 12 CONSERVATION LETTERS 1, 5 (2018). 
142. Id.;) see also Frances Seymour, Indonesia Reduces Deforestation, 
Norway to Pay Up, WORLD RESOURCE INST. (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.wri.org/ 
blog/2019/02/indonesia-reduces-deforestation-norway-pay 
[https://perma.cc/L7S2-N68Z] (noting that Indonesia experienced a 60% drop in 
forest reduction in 2017 compared to 2016). 
143. Gaveau et al., supra note 141, at 5. 
144. See id. 
145. Hans Nicholas Jong, Haze from Forest Fires, Indonesia’s National 
‘Embarrassment,’ are Back, MONGABAY (Aug. 6, 2019), 
https://news.mongabay.com/2019/08/haze-from-fires-indonesias-national-
embarrassment-are-back/ [https://perma.cc/L2NV-KPQ9]. 
146. Hans Nicholas Jong, Indonesia Fires Emitted Double the Carbon of 
Amazon Fires, Research Shows, MONGABAY (Nov. 25, 2019),  
https://news.mongabay.com/2019/11/indonesia-fires-amazon-carbon-emissions-
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Further, qualifying for REDD+ payments alone may not prove 
a sufficient incentive to overcome longstanding barriers to the 
effectiveness of these public law measures. Indonesia’s ERPD 
pinpoints that challenges include the “high opportunity costs of 
REDD+”: 
In some cases, the short-term benefits associated with 
deforestation . . . outweigh the incentives that REDD+ payments 
can provide . . . REDD+ funding alone may not be able to compete 
with the private economic benefits of, for example, legally 
converting forest to oil palm plantations or mining sites. These 
activities provide significant financial returns, and protection of 
forests- including sustainable management practices such as 
reduced impact logging and voluntary certification- are often seen 
as incurring significant costs, without direct benefits. This 
problem is compounded by the lack of differentiation of commodity 
prices on the basis of sustainability.147 
In addition, it remains to be seen how national environmental 
objectives will align with the government’s economic and rural 
development goals.  The government has challenged the validity of 
the EU’s restrictions on unsustainable biofuel as an impermissible 
restriction on trade.148 This reaction is indicative of the importance 
placed on palm oil, as a major export, for realizing Indonesia’s 
development goals. 
B. Private Law Mechanisms 
As this fragmented landscape of public governance measures 
failed to halt deforestation, private sector actors faced increasing 
demands to address the adverse consequences of soft commodities 
they produced or that were part of their supply chain. Advocacy 
campaigns by NGOs, conducted through social media, highlighted 
the destructive impact of “dirty” palm oil on forest wildlife. 
Specifically, Greenpeace and Rainforest Action Network targeted 
 
peatland/ [https://perma.cc/U2X9-RKM8] (reporting that the concentration of 
fires in peatlands caused a spike in Indonesia’s GHG emissions that could prevent 
achievement of its NDC reduction targets). 
147. ERPD, supra note 62, at 78. 
148. See Jong, supra note 5 (reporting Indonesia’s claim, denied by the EU, 
that the phasing out of palm oil constitutes discrimination because it favors 
European producers of other oil crops). 
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corporations such as Nestlé, Proctor & Gamble, Unilever, and 
Cargill as parties responsible for destruction of orangutan, 
elephant, and tiger habitats, displacement of local populations, 
and palm oil estates’ contribution to climate change.149 In an 
award-winning example that went viral, a 2010 Greenpeace UK 
video shows an office worker snacking on a Nestlé KitKat™ bar 
which then transforms into a bloody orangutan paw.150 This 
campaign to pressure multinational players sought to leverage 
their influence on direct and indirect suppliers.151 
The result of such criticism was the creation of a parallel set 
of governance mechanisms through both unilateral and multi-
stakeholder initiatives.  In effect, these mechanisms established 
private law systems that stepped in to achieve an objective or serve 
a function traditionally belonging to the government.152 Private 
actors such as multinational companies with a global supply chain 
may be able to influence behavior across geographical boundaries 
more easily than political entities could achieve, especially in light 
of the resistance to international governance over management of 
forests on sovereignty grounds.153 
Four types of private sector efforts have emerged, directed at 
preventing deforestation in commodity supply chains: (1) 
“collective aspirations” endorsed by different stakeholder groups, 
such as pledges under the New York Declaration and by the 
 
149. Greenpeace UK, Seen P&G’s Thank You Mom? Find out the Hidden 
Truth, YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8NbsVwzTb_A [https://perma.cc/6ZEX-
T75U]; Greenpeace International, Protect Paradise: An Animation about Palm 
Oil, YOUTUBE (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=0o6WHN4NDTk [https://perma.cc/VKJ9-FCLV]; Gillis, supra note 1; 
Palm Oil Fact Sheet, RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK, 
https://www.ran.org/palm_oil_fact_sheet/ [https://perma.cc/EYL3-AAPV]. 
150. Greenpeace UK, Have a Break?, YOUTUBE (Mar. 17, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=VaJjPRwExO8 [https://perma.cc/RSV2-YDVY]. The post of the video includes 
the following caption: “Nestlé, maker of Kit Kat, uses palm oil from companies 
that are trashing Indonesian rainforests, threatening the livelihoods of local 
people and pushing orang-utans towards extinction. We all deserve to have a 
break - but having one shouldn’t involve taking a bite out of Indonesia’s precious 
rainforests. We’re asking Nestlé to give rainforests and orang-utans a break and 
stop buying palm oil from destroyed forests.” Id. 
151. See Pacheco et al., supra note 46, at 32. 
152. Vandenbergh, supra note 91, at 147. 
153. Id. at 138. 
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Consumer Goods Forum (“CGF”) (a trade association); (2) 
individual company commitments to limit or eliminate forest 
clearing in their operations or supply chains; (3) “company codes of 
conduct” imposing requirements on suppliers that must be met in 
order for their products to be purchased or that institute sourcing 
preferences; and (4) “sectoral standards,” developed through 
coordination among stakeholders, establishing agreed principles, 
criteria for qualification, and means of verification of sustainable 
practices.154 These private governance initiatives have deployed 
some of the same tools found in regulatory systems. Standard 
setting organizations, such as voluntary certification authorities, 
use prescriptive mechanisms when they establish qualifying 
criteria and when they impose sanctions by withdrawing 
certification for failure to comply.155 Similarly, buyers of 
commodities may establish purchasing targets for certified 
products, impose requirements in their purchase contracts or 
procurement policies that the origin of products is traceable to 
sustainable sources, or refuse to purchase from geographical areas 
or suppliers associated with deforestation.156 Corporations use 
disclosure methods when they announce commitments to achieve 
sustainable sourcing, and through reporting on the degree of 
progress made against self-imposed deadlines or targets.157 
After focusing on individual and collective corporate actions 
and private certification standards, this Article will then explore 
challenges to their implementation and effectiveness, including 
areas of conflict with the public governance mechanisms described 
above. 
 
154. Lambin et al., supra note 49, at 110. 
155. Id.; see discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
156. See SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 10. 
157. PHILIP ROTHROCK & LAURA WEATHERER, TARGETING ZERO 
DEFORESTATION- COMPANY PROGRESS ON COMMITMENTS THAT COUNT 2–3 (Stephen 
Donofrio and Kelley Hamrick, eds., 2019), http://www.forest-trends.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/2019.06.05-Supply-Change-Targeting-Zero-
Deforestation-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RC4-K2SK]; see discussion 
infra. Part III.B.1; see also Lee Paddock, Stemming the Deforestation Tide: The 
Role of Corporate No Deforestation Commitments, 7 GEO. WASH. J. OF  ENERGY & 
ENVTL. L.  205, 210 (2016) (listing examples of corporate commitments to 
deforestation). 
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1. Corporate Actions 
The impetus for such private sector actions comes from both 
external and internal economic drivers. Companies seek to avoid 
the negative impact to their reputations from being associated 
with deforestation, which can lead to loss of customer loyalty, 
business opportunities, and funding sources.158 They also face 
operational risk, disputes, threats to security of supply, and the 
potential for more stringent regulation or loss of license to 
operate.159 More positive incentives can also influence proactive 
adoption of “green” standards. These can be a differentiating factor 
that help an organization attract and retain employees, improve 
public relations, and influence industry practices to avoid or shape 
regulation.160 A virtuous cycle can result, spurring beneficial 
action because companies fear being perceived as an outlier when 
more and more of their competitors or buyers make deforestation 
commitments. Another powerful motivation has been the failure of 
other governance mechanisms: 
The rapid emergence of zero-deforestation commitments 
encouraged by effective NGO campaigns has been a reaction to a 
sense of urgency among consumers about saving the remaining 
tropical forests. Other policies or sustainability standards (e.g. 
RSPO) were limited by a lack of compliance and enforcement, 
among other issues. Thus, the zero deforestation commitments 
emerged, culminating in the New York Declaration on Forests in 
September 2014, when a number of governments also committed 
to end natural forest loss by 2030.161 
The scope of deforestation restrictions has evolved over the 
last decade, resulting in a variety of approaches. The concept of 
“zero net deforestation” allows some loss of forest cover and 
changed land use as long as “the net quantity, quality and carbon 
 
158. Paddock, supra note 157, at 206; see also Lambin et al., supra note 49, 
at 109 (noting that concerns about adverse impacts spurred corporate 
commitments). 
159. See Lambin et al., supra note 49, at 109, 113. 
160. Paddock, supra note 157, at 206. 
161. Romain Pirard et al., Zero-Deforestation Commitments in Indonesia, 
Governance Challenges, 132 CTR. FOR INT’L FORESTRY RES. 1, 3 (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/ 
pdf_files/infobrief/5871-infobrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/XEW2-3FPP]. 
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density of forests is maintained.”162 The more stringent “zero 
deforestation” standard precludes planting that would result in 
forest conversion.163  After a campaign by international NGOs 
targeted major oil palm traders, adoption of “No Deforestation, No 
Peat, No Exploitation” (“NDPE”) pledges extended the application 
of such undertakings beyond direct operations to those of 
suppliers: 
[t]hese commitments focus primarily on environmental 
sustainability goals, including zero deforestation and zero peat 
conversion. Companies often explicitly commit to preserving high 
carbon stock (HCS) forests and high conservation value (HCV) 
areas, avoiding fires and burning, and adopting best management 
practices for existing plantations on peat. NDPE commitments 
also often include components related to human rights and social 
welfare for workers involved in various stages of the commodity 
supply chain.164 
The scale and reach of these commitments by major global entities 
has been significant. As of 2018, corporate endorsement of the New 
York Declaration’s goal to eliminate deforestation from the 
production of agricultural commodities by 2020 represented a 65% 
share of the production in international palm oil markets.165  
Influential actors in the palm oil supply chain have made “no 
deforestation” pledges and incorporated sustainability 
requirements into their procurement or operating policies. For 
example, these include plantation and mill owners in Indonesia 
(Wilmar and Golden Agri), refiners and commodity traders (Archer 
Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”) and Cargill), buyers and 
manufacturers (Colgate-Palmolive, Nestlé, and Unilever), and 
retailers (Walmart, Marks & Spencer).166 While retailers and 
manufacturers represent the majority of these commitments, the 
 
162. Paddock, supra note 157, at 208 (This approach was originally 
developed by World Wildlife Fund International.). 
163. Id. at 209. 
164. SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 28; see also PADDOCK, supra note 157, 
at 209 (noting that zero deforestation policies may also address social issues such 
as respect for indigenous land rights and the elimination of forced or slave labor). 
165. 2018 SUMMARY, supra note 80, at 1. 
166. Paddock, supra note 157, at 210–212. 
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world’s largest palm oil producers have also participated.167 
Moreover, the CGF,  an industry consortium of approximately 400 
retailers and manufacturers, has been working with governments 
and NGOs to achieve the stated goal of reaching zero net 
deforestation by 2020 in palm oil, soy, beef, and paper and pulp 
supply chains.168  In 2015, the CGF released Palm Oil Sourcing 
Guidelines “to assist companies in designing their own policies for 
sourcing palm oil more sustainably . . . [the Guidelines] were 
developed by CGF retailer and manufacturer members, with input 
from standard setting organisations, NGOs, banks and 
suppliers.”169 
However, critics question how effective many deforestation 
commitments have been, due to a lack of measurable outcomes and 
a failure to apply a consistent standard. Barriers to 
implementation arise internally and from third-party suppliers 
resisting change to business-as-usual practices.170 An examination 
of policy statements on palm oil from three of these multinational 
companies illustrates the common themes, variations, and 
challenges that have arisen. They utilize the forms of private law 
mechanisms outlined above, incorporate principles of forest 
protection from other public and private law sources, and reflect 
involvement of, and reaction to input from, external stakeholders. 
Unilever, a United Kingdom-based consumer products and 
food company, is one of the largest purchasers of palm oil 
worldwide.171 It has shown leadership in the aftermath of a 
 
167. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 48 (explaining that forty-one of the 
fifty palm oil companies have committed to deforestation pledges with twenty-
nine of these companies also implementing zero deforestation policies). 
168. The Consumer Goods Forum and the United States Government 
Announce a Joint Initiative on Deforestation, CONSUMER GOODS FORUM (June 20, 
2012), https://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/press_releases/the-consumer-
goods-forum-and-the-us-government-announce-a-joint-initiative-on-
deforestation/ [https://perma.cc/C785-RB6R]. 
169. The Consumer Goods Forum Publishes Sustainable Palm Oil Sourcing 
Guidelines, CONSUMER GOODS FORUM (Aug. 11, 2015), 
https://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/press_releases/the-consumer-goods-
forum-publishes-palm-oil-sourcing-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/2L6C-KHHE]. 
170. See Pacheco et al., supra note 46, at 33. 
171. Transforming the Palm Oil Industry, UNILEVER, 
https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/reducing-environmental-
impact/sustainable-sourcing/transforming-the-palm-oil-industry/ 
[https://perma.cc/8QYJ-2GTV]. 
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negative media campaign, turning criticism into groundbreaking 
efforts to achieve sustainability in its agricultural supply chains.  
In 2009, Unilever was one of the first to make a public commitment 
that 100% of its palm oil would be from certified sources, as part of 
its broader pledge that by 2020, 100% of its agricultural raw 
materials would be sustainably produced.172 It established a 
Sustainable Palm Oil Sourcing Policy in 2016 that applies to its 
global operations, “including [its] investments in plantations and 
refining, and to all [its] suppliers and their entire operations, 
including traders and their third parties.”173 This use of its market 
power to impose NDPE restrictions on all these supply chain actors 
can have great influence: 
Given the scale of Unilever’s palm oil supply chain, [its] NDPE 
commitment has significant implications for the sustainability of 
Indonesia’s palm oil sector, and for the broader forest-related goals 
outlined in the country’s NDC. The [Sourcing] Policy also includes 
goals related to facilitating the inclusion of smallholders 
throughout Unilever’s palm oil supply chain, and promoting 
transparency in the operations of its suppliers.174 
Unilever reports that in 2017, 56% of its palm oil purchases were 
sustainably sourced palm oil certified by the RSPO or an 
equivalent standard independently verified by a third party, which 
amount increased to 67% in 2018.175 Recognizing the difficulty of 
achieving its 100% target, Unilever has instituted several 
initiatives to improve transparency of its sources, while 
highlighting challenges arising from a complex supply chain.176 
 
172. SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 29. 
173. UNILEVER, UNILEVER SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL SOURCING POLICY – 2016 1 
(2016), https://www.unilever.com/ 
Images/unilever-palm-oil-policy-2016_tcm244-479933_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B33U-YJY9]. 
174. SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 29–30. 
175. Our Approach to Sustainable Palm Oil, UNILEVER, 
https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/reducing-environmental-
impact/sustainable-sourcing/transforming-the-palm-oil-industry/our-approach-
to-sustainable-palm-oil/ [https://perma.cc/9CRT-Z5D8]. 
176. Improving the Visibility of our Supply Chain, UNILEVER, 
https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/reducing-environmental-
impact/sustainable-sourcing/transforming-the-palm-oil-industry/improving-the-
visibility-of-our-supply-chain/ [https://perma.cc/4KBS-TNAR] (discussing the 
company goal of achieving full traceability for purchased palm oil and the 
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Since February 2018, it has published a list of over 1,600 palm oil 
mills it sources from, directly or indirectly, as well as its palm oil 
supplier list and reports that it has traced 88% of sourced palm oil 
back to the mill.177 
ADM, a US headquartered major agricultural processor and 
trader, announced its NDPE commitment in 2015, pledging to 
“build traceable and transparent agricultural supply chains that 
protect forests worldwide . . . through policies focused on palm oil 
and soy supply chains.”178 ADM has worked with Forest Trust, an 
NGO, to implement its NDPE sourcing policy, which prohibits: (1) 
deforestation of High Carbon Stock (“HCS”) forests and High 
Conservation Value (“HCV”) areas (2) new peatland development, 
and (3) exploitation of local communities or laborers.179 ADM 
incorporates the HCS Forest Approach developed by 
Greenpeace,180 and the Common Guidance developed by the HCV 
Network for the identification of HCV areas.181 It also prohibits 
use of fire to clear land for palm production, citing 2013 RSPO 
 
challenges posed by this goal that led the company to create mapping and data 
programs and invest in its own refineries). 
177. Id. 
178. ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND (ADM), OUR COMMITMENT TO NO-
DEFORESTATION 1 (2015), https://assets.adm.com/Sustainability/ADM-No-
Deforestation-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SZQ-R4NE] [hereinafter ADM]. 
179. No Deforestation, No Planting on Peat, No Exploitation (NO DPE) Policy 
FAQs, ADM, https://www.adm.com/sustainability/sustainability-progress-
tracker/faqs [https://perma.cc/V523-C7BY]. 
180. Id. (prohibiting the clearing of primary forests as well as “High, 
Medium, Low Density and Regenerating forests,” while allowing “Young Scrub, 
Cleared/Open Land areas, existing plantations or other land already in 
agricultural production . . .” to be developed); see also HCS Approach, 
GREENPEACE INT’L,  https://www.greenpeace.org/archive-
international/en/campaigns/forests/solutions/HCS-Approach/ 
[https://perma.cc/9UC2-RKHV] (explaining that this approach encompasses 
carbon and biodiversity conservation and only allows for areas containing low 
carbon to be considered for conversion into plantations, thereby protecting areas 
with young regenerating forests and secondary forest). 
181. ADM, supra note 178, at 1 n.3; HCV RESOURCE NETWORK, COMMON 
GUIDANCE FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH CONSERVATION VALUES 3, fig. 1 (Sept. 
2017), https://hcvnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ 
HCVCommonGuide_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2XG-SC8C]; How it Works, 
HCV RESOURCE NETWORK, https://hcvnetwork.org/how-it-works/ 
[https://perma.cc/WJ3C-K3RC] (discussing that this involves a review of 
geographical areas to determine if they are essential for species diversity and 
ecosystem stability or possess other social or cultural value critically important 
to the region). 
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Principles and Criteria Section 5.5.182 ADM’s most current report 
on Palm Oil Supply Chain Traceability, for the period of January 
2018 through December 2018, illustrates the difficulties of 
identifying sources back to the producer level.183 Overall, ADM 
reports that it can trace 98.1% and 98.7%, respectively, of Palm Oil 
and Palm Kernel Oil to the Mill level, while only 16.4% and 17.0%, 
respectively, are traceable back to the specific plantation.184 It 
publishes a list of palm oil mills it sources from, including 
approximately 1,000 mills located in Indonesia.185 
Nestlé, the Swiss-based food manufacturer, committed in 2010 
to ending deforestation in its supply chain, and endorsed CGF’s 
zero net deforestation by 2020 objective.186 It reported that in 
2018, 64% of palm oil that it purchased was responsibly sourced.187 
Nestlé’s responsible sourcing guidelines, established in July 2018, 
have some elements in common with those of Unilever and ADM, 
but also differences. They do not permit production on, or 
expansion into, areas that were converted after 2015 from HCS 
forests, peatlands, savannahs, or wetlands; any planting in IUCN 
protected areas, UNESCO World Heritage Sites, or Ramsar List 
wetlands; or cultivation of any peatlands, unless adequately 
protected during farming.188  Nestlé will take due diligence steps 
 
182. ADOPTION OF PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR THE PRODUCTION OF 
SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL 31 (Apr. 25, 2013) 
https://www.rspo.org/file/revisedPandC2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ6U-T2MW]. 
As discussed below, more restrictive provisions have been incorporated into 
RSPO’s 2018 version of Principles and Criteria. 
183. See generally ADM GLOBAL- PALM OIL SUPPLY CHAIN TRACEABILITY, 
JANUARY 2018 ‐ DECEMBER 2018, ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND (2019), 
https://assets.adm.com/Sustainability/2018-Reports/ADM-Global-2018-H2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y2CF-ZTMT]. 
184. Id. (noting that plantation-level information is based solely on self‐
reported information from suppliers, which ADM doesn’t verify). 
185. Id. (These mills are sourced indirectly through third‐party refiners.) 
186. NESTLÉ, NESTLÉ COMMITMENT ON DEFORESTATION AND FOREST 
STEWARDSHIP 3 (Feb. 2013), 
https://www.nestle.com/sites/default/files/assetlibrary/documents/library/docume
nts/corporate_social_responsibility/commitment-on-deforestation-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PF6S-SABG] [hereinafter NESTLÉ COMMITMENT]. 
187. Palm Oil, NESTLÉ, https://www.nestle.com/csv/raw-materials/palm-oil 
[https://perma.cc/UQ73-SX36] [hereinafter Palm Oil]. 
188. NESTLÉ, NESTLÉ RESPONSIBLE SOURCING STANDARD 16 (July 2018), 
https://www.nestle.com/sites/default/files/ 
asset-library/documents/library/documents/suppliers/nestle-responsible-
sourcing-standard-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y27S-4TLL]. 
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to verify what is occurring at the level of production.189 However, 
despite these commitments, a 2018 Greenpeace report faults 
Nestlé, as well as Mars, PepsiCo, and Unilever, for continuing to 
source from affiliates of a palm oil producer responsible for illegal 
clearing of a huge swath of protected forest areas in the 
biodiversity-rich region of Papua.190 
In Papua, it appears that NDPE pledges have reduced 
deforestation well below 2015 peak levels, but that the rate of 
clearing is still the highest in Indonesia.191  Investigation of how 
NDPE policies of major trading companies have been applied to 
plantations in that region provide insight into their impact and 
many challenges. Traders have borrowed from public regulatory 
tools, requiring growers to declare a moratorium on clearing in 
their concession areas until they demonstrate compliance with 
HCV and HCS criteria.192 In some cases, they have suspended 
suppliers to minimize the deforestation risk in their supply 
chain.193 In addition, disclosure mechanisms are being utilized, 
both through publicizing lists of their own suppliers, as well as 
requiring suppliers to disclose maps of their concessions.194 Use of 
satellite monitoring to track where clearing is occurring also helps 
audit NDPE compliance.195 
Despite these efforts, murky ownership structures make it 
difficult to uncover the entities responsible for deforestation, and 
growers’ failures to meet deadlines for NDPE compliance have 
been overlooked. In addition, insufficient progress has been made 
to ensure “no exploitation”, including the requirement that free, 
prior, and informed consent is obtained before clearing land that is 
subject to customary land rights of local populations.196 The 
voluntary nature of corporate NDPE commitments, coupled with 
weak incentives to comply, and no standardization of monitoring 
 
189. Palm Oil, supra note 187 (committing to the mapping and identification 
of areas at risk of deforestation, supply chain tracking of ingredient origins, on-
the-ground assessments, and monitoring of deforestation mitigation projects). 
190. Ruiz, supra note 1. 
191. See EIA, supra note 126, at 8. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 9. 
194. Id. at 13. 
195. Id.; see also the discussion of use of technology tools, infra Part V.B. 
196. Id. at 10. 
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or reporting mechanisms, make them an ineffective substitute for 
regulatory measures with teeth.197 
Environmental NGOs have focused on these shortcomings. 
They track the extent of deforestation-related requirements 
specified in public commitments and procurement policies, as well 
as progress reported against those commitments, and then rate 
corporations critically.198  The pressure to act has also come from 
funding sources. In 2013, the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund 
divested its interest in Golden Agri-Resources and Wilmar, two 
major producers and refiners, because of concerns about 
insufficient action by those companies to combat deforestation.199 
Resolutions filed by major investors led ConAgra Foods, and in 
turn its supplier Cargill, to agree to phase out purchasing from 
suppliers engaged in unsustainable practices.200 
Another external stakeholder approach to rectifying 
shortcomings in corporate sustainability efforts is the recent AF 
initiative. This joint effort of environmental and social NGOs 
recognized the need for greater consistency in forest-related 
definitions and objectives and that companies needed guidance on 
best practices to achieve transparent and measurable results.201 
The AF “responds to requests from the private sector for NGOs to 
develop a clear and common set of implementation guidelines . . . 
[and] the need for common measures of success that can be 
pursued and monitored across the full range of commodity and 
geographic contexts where [corporate] commitments apply.”202 
Corporate actors would commit to a deforestation-free supply 
 
197. Id. at 14–15. 
198. A consortium of NGOs has created SupplyChange, a website that 
consolidates various third-party scores, rankings or credentials assessing 
adequacy of the actions corporations are taking with respect to sustainable palm 
oil, and cites negative media reports. Methodology, SUPPLYCHANGE, http://supply-
change.org/pages/ 
methodology#commitments-defined [https://perma.cc/B2F7-LL72]. 
199. Investors Push Palm Oil to Act on Deforestation, INNOVATION FORUM 
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://innovation-forum.co.uk/analysis.php?s=investors-push-
palm-oil-to-act-on-deforestation [https://perma.cc/FC56-TW35]. 
200. Lucia von Reusner, Food Giant ConAgra Agrees to Eliminate Suppliers 
Engaged in Deforestation for Palm Oil, GREEN CENTURY FUNDS (Aug. 14, 2014), 
https://www.greencentury.com/food-giant-conagra-agrees-to-eliminate-suppliers-
engaged-in-deforestation-for-palm-oil/ [https://perma.cc/75Z5-D6G5]. 
201. Accountability Framework, supra note 15. 
202. Id. 
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chain as part of a broader pledge not to convert other natural 
ecosystems, including peatlands, in connection with their 
production, trading, or purchase of commodities.203 They would 
also specify a target date for full achievement of commitments as 
well as a cut-off date for compliance.204 Depending on the duration, 
severity, or extent of supplier non-compliance, the corporate buyer 
would take action ranging from engagement with suppliers to 
improve their practices, enhanced monitoring, or suspension of 
purchasing if warranted.205  These Core Principles, together with 
Operational Guidance materials,206 are designed to assist all 
supply chain actors with supply chain management (risk 
assessment, traceability and identification, and resolution of 
supplier non-compliance), to encourage smallholder inclusion, and 
to minimize social impact through respecting rights of local 
communities and indigenous peoples by obtaining their free, prior, 
and informed consent for land acquisition and forest conversion.207 
As outlined above, as target dates for 2020 commitments 
approach, individual and collective corporate actions, the first 
category of private sector governance discussed in this Article, 
have a long way to go before meeting the objective of eliminating 
deforestation from commodity supply chains. The next section of 
this Article focuses on the second category of private governance, 
certification standards for palm oil, and the similar challenges to 
effectiveness they have encountered. 
2. Certification Authorities for Palm Oil 
Another private sector response to the social and 
environmental concerns associated with agricultural commodities 
 
203. ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK, CORE PRINCIPLES 4–5 (2019), 
https://accountability-framework.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Accountability 
_Framework_Core_Principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RE3-5ETB] [hereinafter 
CORE PRINCIPLES]. 
204. Id. at 11–12, 17. 
205. See generally ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK, OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE ON 
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT (2019), https://accountability-framework.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/Operational_Guidance_Supply_Chain_ 
Management.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQU6-JNCC]. 
206. Id.; CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 203. 
207. See e.g., Contents of the Accountability Framework, ACCOUNTABILITY 
FRAMEWORK, https://accountability-framework.org/contents-of-the-framework/ 
[https://perma.cc/F7NZ-HN8S]. 
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has been the creation of voluntary certification authorities. In the 
case of palm oil, the RSPO was established as a not-for-profit 
organization in 2004 through efforts of industry participants, 
including Unilever and the World Wildlife Fund.208  The RSPO’s 
current membership of over 4,000 entities includes stakeholders 
from all segments of the supply chain who have committed to 
produce, source, and/or use RSPO certified palm oil, as well as 
banks, investors and NGOs.209 RSPO’s mission is to: 
Advance the production, procurement, finance and use of 
sustainable palm oil products[;] [to] Develop, implement, verify, 
assure and periodically review credible global standards for the 
entire supply chain of sustainable palm oil[;] [to] Monitor and 
evaluate the economic, environmental and social impacts of the 
uptake of sustainable palm oil in the market[;] [and to] Engage 
and commit all stakeholders throughout the supply chain, 
including governments and consumers.210 
The organization reports that 19% of palm oil produced globally, 
over half of which is grown in Indonesia (i.e., 14.8 million tons as 
of July 31, 2019), is certified by RSPO.211 However, as of 2017 its 
membership contained only 175 oil palm growers, suggesting that 
the demand for certified palm oil is “limited to a niche market.”212 
Initially launched in 2007, these standards were revised in 
2013 (“RSPO P&C 2013”) and, most recently, in 2018 (“RSPO P&C 
2018”), to enhance their coverage and governance.213  RSPO 
standards consist of Principles, Criteria, Indicators, and Guidance 
 
208. Who We Are, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, 
https://www.rspo.org/about#who-we-are [https://perma.cc/U9RJ-E2CD] 
[hereinafter ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL]. 
209. About, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, 
https://www.rspo.org/about#vision-mission [https://perma.cc/FJM7-GAAF]. 
210. Vision & Missions, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, 
https://www.rspo.org/about#vision-mission [https://perma.cc/FJM7-GAAF]. 
211. Impact, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, https://rspo.org/impact 
[https://perma.cc/3RJ8-8TWQ]; see also About Sustainable Palm Oil, 
ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, https://rspo.org/about#about-
sustainable-palm-oil [https://perma.cc/M96N-9X2T] (noting that RSPO certifies 
palm oil). 
212. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 47. 
213. History & Milestones, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, 
https://www.rspo.org/about#history-and-milestone [https://perma.cc/P44M-
9XPZ]. 
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to be used by oil palm producers to implement sustainable 
production practices, and by certification bodies for auditing of 
these practices. From the outset, these have required monitoring 
of compliance at the farm level to ensure that no deforestation had 
occurred since 2005 on the land producing the certified palm oil.214 
Organizations that purchase or take possession of  RSPO-certified 
oil palm products must implement appropriate controls to prevent 
misidentification or commingling of certified and uncertified 
products.215 Mills or other users of those products “can claim the 
use of (or support of) RSPO certified oil palm products when they 
adhere to the requirements of the RSPO Supply Chain 
Certification Standard and this is independently verified by an 
RSPO approved and accredited certification body.”216 
Corporations have incorporated RSPO certification into their 
supplier codes and procurement requirements.  The CGF 
recommends incorporation of certification standards such as the 
RSPO to assist its members in meeting their zero deforestation 
pledges.217 Global companies that have committed to source 100% 
RSPO certified palm oil include, among others, Unilever, Nestlé, 
P&G, and Walmart.218 
 
214. See ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, RSPO CERTIFICATION 
SYSTEMS 8 (June 26, 2007), https://www.rspo.org/library/lib_files/preview/827 
[https://perma.cc/7AUG-4B53]; ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, 
PRINCIPLES & CRITERIA FOR THE PRODUCTION OF SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL 2018 62 
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.rspo.org/principles-and-criteria-review#updates 
[https://perma.cc/7TXE-AAVA] [hereinafter 2018 PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA]; 
ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, PRINCIPLES AND & CRITERIA FOR THE 
PRODUCTION OF SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL 2013 48  (Apr. 25, 2013), 
https://www.rspo.org/resources/certification/rspo-principles-criteria-certification 
[https://perma.cc/W3WR-TEK8] [hereinafter 2013 PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA]. 
215. RSPO Certification, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, 
https://rspo.org/certification [https://perma.cc/8U82-8HKU]. 
216. See Standards Map, INT’L TRADE CTR., 
http://www.standardsmap.org/identify [https://perma.cc/PN66-MC8Z] (describing 
the supply chain certification methods used by RSPO). 
217. The Consumer Goods Forum Publishes Palm Oil Sourcing Guidelines, 
CONSUMER GOODS FORUM (Aug. 11, 2015), 
https://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/press_releases/the-consumer-goods-
forum-publishes-palm-oil-sourcing-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/F9QA-5ZM5]; 
see also Lambin et al., supra note 49, at 110–11 (describing that 85% of companies 
with deforestation commitments relied on certification to identify suppliers and 
further suggesting that certification systems can be used as a tool for preferential 
market access). 
218. ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, supra note 208. 
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Notwithstanding this widespread recognition in the corporate 
sector, and to some degree because of its involvement, the RSPO 
Principles & Criteria (“P&C”) have been subject to criticism for not 
being sufficiently stringent. RSPO’s pre-2018 P&C standard 
limited the type of land that could be developed for oil palm, but 
did not require zero deforestation.219  It prohibited plantings only 
in primary forest or HCV areas.220 Peatland development was not 
banned unless it involved “extensive planting” (>100 hectares), or 
as otherwise permitted under national law.221 Prior to 
development of land that was subject to demonstrated legal, 
customary, or user rights, producers were required to obtain free, 
prior, and informed consent from local communities.222 Use of fire 
to prepare land for planting was to be avoided, except where 
permitted under local law, regional guidelines, or other regional 
best practice, and was only to be used with “exceptional levels of 
caution” on peat.223 
These rules left significant gaps, permitting deforestation 
outside of HCV areas, and not precluding development of 
peatlands. Economic interests pushed back against inclusion of 
effective environmental protections in the 2013 P&C.224 Gaps in 
the scope of HCV protections (including a failure to require that 
growers disclose HCV locations within concessions) as well as 
questions about the credibility of RSPO-certified auditors led to 
charges that RSPO certification enabled “greenwashing” of palm 
oil produced after recent conversion of forests or peatlands.225 
Whether the certification process has actually prevented 
deforestation is also unclear. A comparison of RSPO-certified 
 
219. Kimberly M. Carlson et al., Effect of Oil Palm Sustainability 
Certification on Deforestation and Fire in Indonesia, 115 PROC. OF THE NAT’L 
ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 121, 121 (2018); see also 2013 PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA, 
supra note 214, at 50 (discussing Section 7.3.1 of RSPO’s 2013 Criteria requiring 
that there be no evidence of new plantings replacing primary forest or areas 
otherwise designated as High Conservation Value). 
220. 2013 PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA, supra note 214, at 50. 
221. See id. at 52. 
222. Id. at 53 (detailing that this process is governed by a documentation 
system that permits local peoples and stakeholders to use their own 
representative institutions to express their views). 
223. Id. at 31 (referencing the “Guidelines for the Implementation of the 
ASEAN Policy on Zero Burning 2003”). 
224. Carlson et al., supra note 219, at 122. 
225. Id. 
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plantations against uncertified areas indicates that certified areas 
experienced a 33% reduction in forest loss.226 However, selection 
bias may have operated when producers chose which of their 
plantations to certify, favoring the oldest ones that were already 
planted on land cleared of forests pre-2005.227 
Equally objectionable has been RSPO’s failure to enforce these 
standards to ensure certified companies are in compliance.228 
There are reported cases of certified companies trading palm oil 
obtained from mills that sourced from illegal plantations.229 
Certified plantations have incurred some deforestation, including 
in primary and peatland forests, meaning that some certified 
plantations may have violated RSPO standards.230  The RSPO has 
been criticized by Greenpeace and other NGOs, including for 
inadequately investigating several certified producers accused of 
responsibility for plantation fires.231 “Unreliable audits, poor 
implementation and failures to resolve complaints, alongside an 
inability to adapt their requirements in time to meet market 
demands, has hindered the acceptance and uptake of 
certification.”232 These shortcomings were highlighted by the 
European Parliament in its 2017 Resolution on palm oil and 
deforestation of rainforests, which arose from concerns about the 
consequences of the EU’s importation of palm oil for use as 
biofuel.233  Such concerns led the European Commission to change 
the standards for biofuel eligibility under RED II, which will 
undoubtedly reduce the EU’s imports of palm oil unless certified 
under an approved voluntary certification scheme.234 
 
226. Id. at 121. 
227. Id. at 122, 124; Lambin et al., supra note 49, at 112–13. 
228. Pacheco et. al., supra note 46, at 32. 
229. Meijaard et al., supra note 34, at 61. 
230. Carlson, supra note 219, at 124. 
231. Helen Davidson, Palm Oil Body Criticised over Inquiry into Members’ 
Role in Indonesian Fires, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/12/palm-oil-industry-indonesia-
fires [https://perma.cc/7PSD-FYQZ]. 
232. EIA, supra note 126, at 14. 
233. European Parliament Resolution of 4 April, 2017, supra note 41, at ¶ 42 
(highlighting criticisms of RSPO, ISPO, the Malaysian government’s national 
palm oil certification body, and other certification schemes for failing to effectively 
prohibit the conversion of rainforests and peatlands). 
234. See infra text accompanying note 255. 
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RSPO has tried to improve its enforcement record, to mixed 
reviews. For example, in April 2016, it suspended a grower, IOI 
Group, following a determination of non-compliance with 
certification requirements, including inadequate protection of peat 
areas and forests.235 Subsequently, Unilever, Kellogg,  Nestlé, and 
other purchasers stopped sourcing from the suspended 
company.236 In addition, RSPO suspended Nestlé briefly in 2018 
for failure to report its plans for increased purchase of certified 
palm oil.237  After RSPO investigated a complaint filed in 2016 by 
local and international advocacy groups, it suspended the 
certification of a mill and plantations affiliated with Indofoods, one 
of Indonesia’s largest producers.238 Due to its multiple labor rights 
violations, Indofoods breached P&Cs, as well as local law.239 
However, RSPO’s November 2018 suspension lagged far behind 
decisions by Unilever, Nestlé, Mars, PepsiCo, and other 
corporations with NDPE pledges to stop doing business with this 
group.240 Further, Citigroup already exited from its banking 
relationship with the Indofood corporate group’s palm oil business, 
and the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global divested its 
 
235. CERES, AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY CHAINS AS A DRIVER OF FINANCIAL RISKS 8 
(Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/Engage%20the%20Chain/Ceres_Engage
TheChain_Risks_110417.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX62-YMVF]. 
236. Id. at 8. 
237. Ana Ionova & Martinne Geller, Can ‘Big Brother’ Technology Clean up 
Palm Oil’s Image?, REUTERS (Feb.11, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
palmoil-technology-insight/can-big-brother-technology-clean-up-palm-oils-
image-idUSKCN1Q00DD [https://perma.cc/9MA9-B2AF]. 
238. Letter from Henry Barlow, Chairperson of the RSPO Complaints Panel, 
RSPO (Nov. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Letter from RSPO to PT PP London Sumatra]. 
Subsequently, as a result of the suspended entity’s failure to comply with the 
conditions in the November 2, 2018 letter, the RSPO terminated its membership 
together with that of its parent company. RSPO Secretariat’s Statement On 
Complaints Panel Decision Regarding PT Salim Ivomas Pratama Tbk, 
ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL (Mar. 1, 2019), https://rspo.org/news-and-
events/news/rspo-secretariats-statement-on-complaints-panel-decision-
regarding-pt-salim-ivomas-pratama-tbk [https://perma.cc/M778-MPCY]. 
239. See generally Letter from RSPO to PT PP London Sumatra, supra note 
238. 
240. Palm Oil Giant Indofood Subsidiary Loses Sustainability Certification 
Over Labor Abuses; Suspension of RSPO Membership Looms, RAINFOREST ACTION 
NETWORK (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.ran.org/press-releases/palm-oil-giant-
indofood-subsidiary-loses-sustainability-certification-over-labor-abuses-
suspension-of-rspo-membership-looms/ [https://perma.cc/QWH2-RJFD]. 
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equity interest.241 The transparency of RSPO’s claims 
investigation process, including with respect to alleged illegal 
operation of plantations in Papua without a permit, has also been 
criticized.242 
The corporations that made NDPE commitments pressured 
RSPO to ensure that its certification of oil palm supplies could be 
relied on as a means to comply with these pledges.243  Leverage on 
the organization and its membership exercised by external 
stakeholders raised the stakes.244  In response, RSPO amended its 
P&C in November 2018, to align more closely with corporate 
NDPE commitments and to tighten controls, with new 
requirements to be fully implemented by November 2019.245 The 
new standards expand restrictions on deforestation and 
degradation to protect HCS forest areas and mandate that both 
HCV and HCS areas be assessed before any new land clearing after 
November 15, 2018.246 In addition, after that date, no new 
plantings are permitted on peat “regardless of depth,” in both 
existing and newly developed areas.247  To reinforce risk 
 
241. The Chain: Citigroup Cancels Loans to Indofood Agri Resources and its 
Subsidiaries, CHAIN REACTION RES. (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://chainreactionresearch.com/the-chain-citigroup-cancels-loans-to-indofood-
agri-resources-and-its-subsidiaries/ [https://perma.cc/9LN6-CQTJ] (citing reports 
that companies in the Indofood group had questionable rights to operate in 
portions of their plantation concessions, were involved in disputes with local 
communities and had been responsible for deforestation, including clearing of 
peatlands). 
242. See RSPO Finally Agrees Oil Palm Plantation’s Legality Needs 
Investigation – but Complaints Remain Hidden with Insignificant Progress, 
ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY (Apr. 25, 2018), https://eia-
international.org/news/rspo-finally-agrees-oil-palm-plantations-legality-needs-
investigation-but-complaints-remain-hidden-with-insignificant-progress/ 
[https://perma.cc/D9GT-ZZNZ]. 
243. Carlson et al., supra note 219, at 125. 
244. CARBON TRUST, CASCADING COMMITMENTS: DRIVING AMBITIOUS ACTION 
THROUGH SUPPLY CHAIN ENGAGEMENT 23 (2019), https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-
c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl 
.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/004/072/original/CDP_Supply_Chai
n_Report_2019.pdf?1550490556 [https://perma.cc/FVM8-NSAT] (explaining that 
investors representing $6.7 trillion in assets successfully pressured RSPO to raise 
its standards for deforestation issues). 
245. See 2018 PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA, supra note 214, at 6. 
246. Id. at 62 (requiring that land clearing does not result in deforestation 
to protected HCVs or HCS forests). 
247. Id. at 57. 
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management mechanisms, mills are now required to obtain 
assurance that unaffiliated FFB providers have complied with 
legal requirements, and to validate this through use of geo-location 
of plantations and proof of the grower’s land ownership, or other 
land rights, and of a valid license to plant or trade.248 In 
recognition of the history of land grabbing practices affecting 
indigenous peoples and local communities, new grievance 
procedures have been established.249 Finally, the 2018 P&C also 
seeks to balance greater economic inclusion of smallholder farmers 
with the need to conserve HCS forests.250 On an exceptional basis, 
limited development of these areas may be approved by a No 
Deforestation Joint Steering Group of RSPO and High Carbon 
Stock Approach  members.251 
Going forward, increased adoption by oil palm growers is also 
critical so that the certification criteria apply to more than the 
largest estates.252 However, while desirable from a forest 
conservation perspective, the enhanced RSPO requirements could 
add to further barriers to adoption. To counteract some of these 
obstacles, the 2018 P&C contemplates a new streamlined 
certification mechanism for independent small producers utilizing 
a phased approach to compliance.253 
In July 2019, an enhanced set of RSPO criteria known as 
RSPO-RED,254 established prior to adoption of the 2018 P&C, was 
accepted by the European Commission as an “approved voluntary 
 
248. Id. at 19. 
249. Id. at 34; see also ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, RSPO P&C 
2018 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION 5–6 (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.rspo.org/principles-and-criteria-review#updates 
[https://perma.cc/QD3F-BST5] (detailing available protections for 
whistleblowers) [hereinafter RSPO P&C FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS]. 
250. 2018 PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA, supra note 214, at 61. 
251. Id. 
252. Meijaard et. al., supra note 34, at 61; see also Pablo Pacheco et.al, The 
Private Sector: Can Zero Deforestation Commitments Save Tropical Forests?, in 
TRANSFORMING REDD+: LESSONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 161, 171 (CIFOR, A. 
Angelsen et al., eds., 2018) (ebook), 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BAngelsen180113.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z2D4-294W] (discussing the shortcomings of certification due to 
lack of buyer demand for zero deforestation practices). 
253.  RSPO P&C FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 249, at 7–8. 
254. RSPO-RED Requirements for Compliance with the EU Renewable 
Energy Directive Requirements, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL (Feb. 10, 
2012), https://rspo.org/certification/rspo-red [https://perma.cc/MNS5-9NGN]. 
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scheme” for sustainably produced biofuel that will be exempted 
from limits on High ILUC risk fuels under RED II.255 This 
designation, which expires in December 2021, was based on a 
determination that RSPO-RED certified biofuel demonstrates low 
ILUC risk and compliance with the EU’s sustainability and GHG 
emission savings criteria.256 The European Commission plans to 
make further changes to the process to reflect the revised RED II 
sustainability criteria.257 Given the European Parliament’s 
previous criticisms of the RSPO, a greater level of scrutiny against 
these criteria is warranted at the next review cycle. As part of that 
future review process, the RSPO should demonstrate that it is 
effectively enforcing the 2018 P&C’s strengthened standards 
designed to prevent destruction of HCV and HCS forests and 
peatlands so that its certification is a legitimate indicator of low 
deforestation risk. 
V. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
As explored in Part IV above, both public and private law 
mechanisms designed to preserve forests have confronted multiple 
obstacles. Prescriptive measures have proven inadequate to 
change conduct by many actors in the palm oil supply chain. 
Governance efforts of governmental bodies, corporate actors, and 
certification authorities have been piecemeal and poorly enforced, 
whether due to conflicting priorities or lack of capacity. Their 
actions have largely occurred in silos. External criticism and 
exercise of economic leverage have triggered adoption of more 
stringent requirements over time in both sectors, but the ability to 
demonstrate effective impact remains elusive. Challenges to 
implementation of zero-deforestation commitments have also 
arisen because of “unclear land titles, a lack of financial and 
 
255. Voluntary Schemes, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (July 31, 2014), 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/biofuels/voluntary-
schemes [https://perma.cc/8L33-2X93] [hereinafter Voluntary Schemes]; see Press 
Release MEMO/19/1656, supra note 6. 
256. See Commission Decision 2019/1175 of July 9, 2019 on Recognition of 
the ‘Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil RED’ Voluntary Scheme for 
Demonstrating Compliance with the Sustainability Criteria under Directives 
98/70/EC and 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 1, 
2019 O.J. (L 184/21) 21–23 (EU). 
257. Voluntary Schemes, supra note 255. 
50https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
 2019] SEEING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES 51 
technical resources for farmers to change their practices, a lack of 
traceability and monitoring systems, and costs of certification and 
other initiatives.”258 
The New York Declaration established the objective of halting 
deforestation caused by production of agricultural commodities by 
2020.259 Corporate pledges to achieve 100% sustainable sourcing 
echoed that timeline. However, due to the challenges outlined 
above, this target is proving out of reach. The 2019 Progress 
Assessment for the New York Declaration and the annual Forest 
500 report for 2018, released by the environmental organization 
Global Canopy, both confirm this assessment.260 While companies 
involved in the palm oil supply chain have demonstrated the most 
progress out of the four agricultural commodities tracked, none of 
these entities have achieved a zero-deforestation supply chain.261  
The Forest 500 report emphasizes the need for manufacturers to 
exert pressure on traders, and for producers to adopt and 
implement comparable no deforestation policies at the plantation 
level.262 
Achieving the objectives of the New York Declaration requires 
a coordinated “all hands on deck” effort in which public regulation 
facilitates and encourages private sector initiatives to control 
deforestation, and the private sector supports and helps 
implement public policy objectives. “Because the scale of the 
deforestation problem is so massive, it is important that a full 
 
258. SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 10. 
259. See New York Declaration on Forests, supra note 18, at §1. 
260. SCHULTE ET AL., supra note 31, at 45 (discussing that the agricultural 
sector is not on track to meet the 2020 target); see also SARAH ROGERSON ET AL, 
GLOBAL CANOPY, FOREST 500 ANNUAL REPORT 2018 - THE COUNTDOWN TO 2020 3, 7 
(2019), https://forest500.org/sites/default/files/related-
documents/forest500_annualreport2018_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB5T-9MTA] 
(detailing the methodology used for assessing the 500 most influential companies 
and financial institutions involved in forest-risk commodity supply chains). 
261. SCHULTE ET AL., supra note 31, at 45; ROGERSON ET AL., supra note 260, 
at 12 (providing a ranking of the 10 highest companies with Nestlé receiving the 
highest Forest 500 rating, followed by Unilever, Sime Darby (a Malaysian trading 
company), and PepsiCo); see also Helen Burley, The Clock is Ticking, GLOBAL 
CANOPY (July 19, 2019), https://medium.com/global-canopy/the-clock-is-ticking-
80eb644bd403 [https://perma.cc/3NAL-EFC9] (discussing why companies are not 
going to reach their 2020 commitments). 
262. ROGERSON ET AL., supra note 260, at 15 (indicating that only 42% of the 
196 companies in the palm oil supply chain have committed to not source from 
HCS forest areas and peatlands and only 16% are reporting on that objective). 
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range of tools including regulations, social pressure, and internal 
economics as reflected in green supply chain management 
arrangements are deployed to address the issue.”263 The following 
discussion identifies several areas in which better coordination is 
needed between and within such mechanisms, and highlights 
practices that could act as a model for concerted action to reduce 
deforestation risk. 
A. Resolving Inconsistency and Conflicts with 
Indonesian Law 
While the Indonesian government’s 2011 Primary Forest 
Moratorium may have inspired the large commodity companies to 
adopt their own zero deforestation policies,264 the government has 
objected to imposition of HCV and HCS forest clearing 
restrictions.265 These standards have been viewed as inconsistent 
with economic development and difficult for smallholders and 
other producers to meet.266 In addition, they exceed the lower bar 
for certification of producer sustainability set by the government 
in establishing the ISPO.267 
Private sector initiatives to implement greater forest 
protections have contributed to these tensions with public policy 
and economic objectives. The Indonesian government’s strong 
opposition to the Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge (“IPOP”), a voluntary 
initiative of international palm oil companies that adopted an 
NPDE policy,268 led to IPOP’s dissolution in 2016.269  IPOP 
encountered resistance from smaller local producers as well as the 
government, which charged that the group’s conduct violated 
 
263. Paddock, supra note 157, at 208. 
264. See SCHAAP EL AL., supra note 30, at 25. 
265. Pirard et al., supra note 161, at 3. 
266. Id. at 6; see also Pacheco et al., supra note 46, at 33 (noting the 
government’s argument that zero deforestation commitments exclude small and 
medium scale enterprises from access to global markets). 
267. Pirard et al., supra note 161, at 4–5; Pacheco et al., supra note 46, at 
32. 
268. Pacheco et. al., supra note 46, at 33; see also IF Editorial Team, Did the 
Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge Fail or Succeed, INNOVATION FORUM (July 7, 2016), 
https://innovation-forum.co.uk/analysis.php?s=did-the-indonesian-palm-oil-
pledge-fail-or-succeed [https://perma.cc/WK2U-JF3R]. 
269. Pacheco et. al., supra note 46, at 33. 
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competition laws and sovereign authority.270 Similarly, the Palm 
Oil Innovation Group (“POIG”), an initiative formed in 2013 by 
environmental advocacy organizations and major producers, has 
advocated for best practice standards that continue to be more 
stringent than those of the RSPO,271 and accordingly, the 
government’s less rigorous ISPO requirements. 
International pressure to implement no deforestation 
requirements has also engendered resistance from the Indonesian 
Government due to concerns that foreign standards and 
regulations affecting palm oil, particularly those of the EU, intrude 
on the country’s national sovereignty and jurisdiction.272 In 
addition, local industry may fear that greater transparency of 
supply chains would expose corruption or illegal activity common 
in that sector.273 
Similarly, the Indonesian government’s emphasis on its 
sovereign rights to determine how to develop resources and 
manage economic growth has clearly fueled its hostile reaction to 
the sustainability restrictions imposed by the EU Biofuel 
Delegated Act and RED II. 
Other challenges arise from misalignment of public and 
private requirements, discouraging forest conservation, and 
creating operating risks for producers. As discussed above, private 
sector certification standards or NDPE commitments often require 
preservation of HCV or HCS forest areas within concessions 
granted for plantation development.274 However, this conflicts 
with the terms on which concessions are granted, which mandate 
planting of all leased areas, including forested lands.275 “Thus, 
RSPO members in Indonesia may avoid acquiring high forest cover 
areas, or excise forests from land leases, to avoid the conflict 
 
270. Id.; see also IF Editorial Team, supra note 268. 
271. See About POIG, PALM OIL INNOVATION GROUP, http://poig.org 
[https://perma.cc/4HRW-9UWC] (describing POIG); see also RSPO and POIG, 
What is POIG’s relevance pursuant to the adoption of the 2018 RSPO P&C?, PALM 
OIL INNOVATION GROUP, http://poig.org/further-resources/rspo-and-poig/ 
[https://perma.cc/VV9R-TC2C] (explaining that POIG supports the improvements 
in RSPO’s 2018 P&C but highlighting remaining weaknesses). 
272. Pacheco et al., supra note 46, at 34. 
273. Id. 
274. See supra Part IV B.1–2. 
275. See Lambin et al., supra note 49, at 113; see Pirard et al., supra note 
161, at 2–3; see SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 26–27. 
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between legality and sustainability.”276 Rather than put licensees 
at risk of losing their concession if they follow best conservation 
practices, the government should change this licensing restriction 
to allow compliance with heightened standards applicable through 
private governance mechanisms.277 Concerns about smallholders 
can be addressed through capacity building to achieve 
sustainability under a separate set of standards, as discussed 
below. There is also a risk that a plethora of inconsistent standards 
imposed by public and private certification bodies, on top of 
individual corporate sourcing policies, sends mixed messages to 
growers as to priorities and imposes additional costs of 
compliance.278 
International and domestic business interests have advocated 
for cooperation with and enforcement support from the public 
sector.  At the time of adoption of the New York Declaration, the 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, Golden Agri-Resources, 
Wilmar International, and Cargill announced a joint pledge, 
covering all their operations and those of third party suppliers, “to 
ensure zero deforestation, to protect human rights and promote 
social development, including through the respect of indigenous 
peoples’ free prior informed consent.”279 These parties also called 
on the Government of Indonesia to “‘codify all elements of this 
pledge within and enforceable by Indonesian law.”280 According to 
industry views, market-based solutions, including voluntary 
sustainability commitments, are not enough.281 The problem of 
 
276. Carlson et al., supra note 219, at 125. 
277. This has occurred at the provincial level. One example is Central 
Kalimantan’s regulation in 2014 which allowed palm oil companies to protect area 
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278. Id. at 32 (discussing the differences between treatment of HCV areas 
under RSPO and ISPO criteria). In 2016, the Indonesian Government announced 
efforts to strengthen ISPO requirements in response to increased market demand 
for sustainably produced palm oil, and against the backdrop of EU concerns about 
ISPO’s shortcomings, but the outcome of that effort is unclear. EIA, Backtracking 
on Reform, supra note 127. 
279. New York Declaration on Forests, supra note 18, at § 3A. 
280. Id. These entities also support the One Map initiatives to encourage the 
Indonesian Government to establish a framework to aid in implementing this 
pledge, such as promoting land swaps, or incentivizing forest conservation. Id. 
281. Reducing Deforestation in Commodity Supply Chains as Temperatures 
Rise, GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY (Oct. 5, 2018), 
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54https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
 2019] SEEING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES 55 
deforestation is wider than each company’s supply chain, and 
requires governments to strengthen regulations. To prevent 
“leakage” towards a market with lower environmental standards, 
buyers and traders have called for governments to enact and apply 
robust forest policies to “ensure a blanket standard for all 
producers and buyers particularly as demand for agricultural 
commodities in India and China grows . . . [this would help] even 
the playing field which currently puts responsible companies at a 
commercial disadvantage to their business as usual 
counterparts.”282 
There have been some promising signs of government 
receptiveness to greater alignment with NDPE commitments. One 
example is the East Kalimantan project for emissions reduction 
(“ER”) under REDD+.283  To qualify for receipt of proceeds from 
sale of carbon credits to be generated by the project, the Indonesian 
government plans to implement additional environmental and 
social risk mitigation measures meeting World Bank 
requirements.284 These would add an overlay of protections to 
existing RSPO or ISPO certification systems and local 
environmental laws applicable to the palm oil sector. Important 
components of the ER plan are implementation of HCV policies for 
oil palm estates, providing training to enable additional producers 
to qualify for RSPO certification, and assistance for smallholder 
farmers with the ISPO certification process.285 
 
temperatures-rise [https://perma.cc/6ZZD-ULYH] [hereinafter Reducing 
Deforestation in Commodity Supply Chains as Temperatures Rise]; see Businesses 
Call for Deeper Partnerships to Build a More Forest Positive Future, WORLD 
BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE BUS.  (Aug. 30, 2019), 
https://www.wbcsd.org/Overview/News-Insights/General/News/Businesses-call-
for-deeper-partnership-to-build-a-more-forest-positive-future 
[https://perma.cc/7ZGC-7HW2] (calling on industry for continued public-private 
sector cooperation and effective regulatory measures in the context of the 2019 
fires in the Amazon). 
282. Reducing Deforestation in Commodity Supply Chains as Temperatures 
Rise, supra note 281. 
283. See ERPD, supra note 62. 
284. Id. at 233. 
285. Id. at 87–90, 122. The Program calls for national government 
coordination with government agencies at the district level and with plantation 
companies to commit to sustainable production which includes providing 
technical assistance to protect HCV forest areas. Id. at 87. 
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Another positive sign that Indonesia has linked enforcement 
of restrictions on forest clearing to meeting its NDC targets is 
contained in the March 2019 report on the Low Carbon 
Development Initiative (“LCDI”), commissioned by the Minister of 
National Development Planning.286 The objective of this initiative 
is to identify the steps that the government must take to meet, and 
even beat, its NDC targets for GHG emissions reductions and to 
incorporate them into economic development planning.287 The 
LCDI report recognizes that one key aspect of achieving a low 
carbon economy is a public policy framework that fosters 
sustainable environmental practices by the private sector.288  This 
framework requires: 
[F]ull enforcement of forests, palm oil, mining and peat land 
moratoria, so by 2045 Indonesia will still be endowed with 41.1 
million ha of primary forests, including nearly 15 million ha of 
peat lands. Of special interest are primary forests, such as those 
in Papua and Kalimantan, and key peat lands and mangrove 
systems that support biodiversity, enhance resilience and 
contribute to carbon emissions reduction targets.289 
The report highlights that the moratorium on new palm oil 
development, which also provides for review of existing 
plantations, affords the opportunity to clarify land tenure rights 
and to tackle forest, agricultural, and land use reforms.290 
B. Transparency & Traceability 
In the palm oil supply chain, a single mill can source from 
multiple growers, and a trader typically purchases oil produced at 
many mills. Downstream actors such as manufacturers, retailers, 
 
286. LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT, supra note 116. This report was prepared 
with the participation of multiple Indonesian ministries, international 
development organizations and environmental NGOs. See Nicholas Stern, 
Commentary: Indonesia is Showing the Way on Sustainable Growth, NEW 
CLIMATE ECONOMY (Oct. 12, 2018), 
https://newclimateeconomy.net/content/commentary-indonesia-showing-way-
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and traders have found it difficult to have visibility into where 
their palm oil supplies originated, particularly if from plantation 
and mills they do not control, and even more so, into the conditions 
under which those supplies were produced.291  The complexity of 
these supply chains have made it challenging to track sources back 
to the grower and mill levels, and despite significant efforts, 
“‘illegal’ palm oil still manages to penetrate the supply chain of 
companies with commitments to certification and “no 
deforestation.”292 
The use of new technology has begun to provide needed 
insight, helping companies with “no deforestation” commitments 
validate whether these have been complied with at the mill or 
grower level.293 This practice may supplement, or be in lieu of, an 
RSPO certification requirement.  The downstream purchaser can 
detect whether suspicious forest clearing has occurred by 
reviewing satellite data in the area surrounding the mill.  For 
example, Nestlé is using the “Starling” satellite system developed 
by Airbus to screen suppliers’ practices.294 It plans to post mill-
specific data on its website to “put responsibility on the mill” and 
has announced plans to suspend doing business with offending 
suppliers that fail to meet its “responsibly sourced” criteria.295  The 
PALM Risk Tool developed by Global Forest Watch uses satellite 
data to create a public database of palm oil mills.296 This tool maps 
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the mills’ locations and allows monitoring of land clearing activity 
nearby.297 These, and other tracking and monitoring tools, have 
been developed to allow a potential buyer or financial institution 
to detect forest loss by specific location and supply chain, or to 
highlight geographical areas posing deforestation risk.298 
Increasing transparency of plantation ownership and activity 
is also facilitated by publication or sharing of maps and land 
classifications of concession areas. As discussed above, some 
traders require that growers disclose their concession maps. In 
some cases, growers have volunteered to share this information 
with the Indonesian government to aid them in peatlands 
restoration.299 Rather than acting in isolation on its One Map 
Initiative, the government should coordinate with the private 
sector and validate the maps they provide. The enhanced RSPO  
P&C 2018 requires producers to demonstrate that their operations 
do not extend into areas subject to local community land rights 
without free, prior, and informed consent, and to develop maps 
showing the extent of the community’s rights through such a 
participatory process.300 
However, instead of encouraging these measures, the 
Indonesian government has taken a protectionist stance by 
encouraging plantation owners not to publish concession maps. In 
a May 6, 2019 letter sent to the country’s palm oil lobby, the 
Coordinating Minister for the Economy advised against sharing 
such data, citing national security and anti-competitive concerns, 
and claimed that disclosure of ownership of concessions 
jeopardized protection of natural resources.301 The minister 
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expressly cited this concern “as a response to the [EU Biofuel] 
delegated act.”302 This public sector action favoring economic and 
geopolitical interests threatens progress toward achieving other 
environmental and social policy objectives facilitated by 
transparency, including the President’s pledge to resolve 
longstanding land conflicts with concession holders in favor of local 
communities.303 
C. Smallholder Farmers and Local Communities 
Additional challenges to private and public governance 
mechanisms alike have come from the role of smallholder farmers 
in the palm oil supply chain, and the land use conflicts that have 
arisen from expansion of this commodity. As discussed in Part III, 
in Indonesia, smallholder farmers represent a significant 35-40% 
of production.304 They face economic challenges from the limited 
productivity of their plantings, which in turn leads to further land 
clearing to supplement inadequate family incomes.305 Tackling 
deforestation requires assisting small-scale farmers to derive more 
palm oil from less land: “[o]ne way to increase crude palm oil (CPO) 
output without expanding into pristine forests is to improve the 
way smallholders cultivate oil palm. On average, smallholder 
plantations yield two tons of CPO a year. But with better seedlings, 
they could more than double their production.”306 
The cost of RSPO certification already puts it out of reach for 
smallholder farmers, creating a disadvantage that amplifies the 
power share of large plantation owners. The modest price premium 
for certified FFB makes it difficult for farmers to recoup those 
costs,307 and has resulted in minimal certification levels for this 
segment of growers: 
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As of 2017, less than 1 percent of independent smallholders’ farms 
were certified as sustainable by the [RSPO] and [ISPO] . . . .Since 
independent smallholders are not linked to any particular 
company or mill, they do not receive training, supervision or 
support from companies, and only receive limited support from the 
government. They get limited information about good agricultural 
practices. This has led to lower productivity and a lower concern 
for sustainability.308 
In addition, the widespread involvement of smallholders 
exacerbates the complexity corporations face in tracing whether 
clearing of HCS and HCV lands has affected their sources. 
The Indonesian government has also acknowledged that its 
failure to establish land tenure rights for local communities, 
including indigenous populations, inhibits good forest 
management and leads to conflict.309 In its LCDI Report, the 
Indonesian government catalogues the adverse effects of past 
policies: 
Indonesia’s strategy to manage forests through concessions and 
through centralized management structures without local 
monitoring and ownership has resulted in the over-exploitation of 
forest assets and resource uses that neither benefit the poor, nor 
create economic value. Local communities’ land access rights are 
limited, and community forestry license programs have not 
achieved their targets. Traditional communities, which 
occupy . . .(a third of total forest areas), have no formal land rights. 
Furthermore, the allocation of concessions for timber, pulp, and 
paper production and, increasingly oil palm plantations, has been 
opaque while the enforcement of spatial and environmental 
planning has been largely ineffective. As a result, the 
deforestation rate is rapid, and is causing the loss of livelihoods for 
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local communities who depend on forest resources for a large part 
of their income.310 
These problems also harm other actors in the supply chain. 
Conflicting land claims enhance the risk of increased costs, delays, 
and uncertainty for producers and investors, and may cause 
reputational damage for actors at all levels of the related supply 
chain.311 Moreover, lack of clarity on who owns specific forest areas 
makes it difficult to appropriately allocate incentives such as 
REDD+ funding.312 
The scale of these challenges necessitates efforts by both 
public and private sectors. Corporate supply chain actors are 
pitching in and collaborating in government efforts, aware of the 
necessity of doing so to accomplish NDPE commitments. For 
example, Wilmar is assisting smallholder oil producers to increase 
their yields as well as to comply with its sustainability standards, 
and is helping independent smallholders qualify for RSPO 
certification as a group.313 Unilever, together with the Provincial 
Government of Central Kalimantan and district-level bodies, is 
piloting a program for jurisdiction-wide certification of all palm oil 
produced within that major cultivation region.314 Other 
participants include Wilmar and Golden Agri.315 This public-
private initiative seeks to increase the productivity of the region’s 
smallholder palm oil producers, reduce deforestation and conflict 
over land rights, and ensure sustainable sourcing.316 To help 
achieve these objectives, Unilever established a program to 
support RSPO certification of regional smallholders, starting with 
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a targeted village.317 According to Unilever, this program would 
create the world’s first certified “sustainable village.”318 
These cooperative efforts offer a path towards realizing the 
new AF initiative’s vision of a coordinated approach between the 
private sector and governments to achieve common goals of forest 
conservation and respect for human rights: 
Responsible supply chain initiatives must not take place in 
isolation, but in synergy with governments and others working to 
halt deforestation, improve land governance, reform public 
policies and incentives, and shift consumption patterns to respect 
the Earth’s finite resources. When this multi-pronged approach is 
effective, supply chain initiatives help to end deforestation and 
conversion at landscape scales while contributing to Nationally-
Determined Contributions for greenhouse gas reductions under 
the Paris Agreement. They support equitable rural development 
and the wellbeing of smallholders, workers, and communities. And 
they are undiluted by the leakage of negative impacts to other 
locations, commodity sectors, or ecosystem types.319 
Adoption of a coordinated approach would enhance the capacity of 
the private sector to produce palm oil that meets internationally 
recognized sustainability criteria and would avoid the risks 
associated with deforestation. For Indonesia, it would help 
demonstrate that its policies are guiding the country away from a 
historical pattern of forest destruction, minimize the economic 
effect of EU biofuel restrictions, and reinforce the government’s 
capacity to achieve its emissions reductions targets. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF FORESTS: 
2020 AND BEYOND 
There is intense focus on January 1, 2020, as the point in time 
to assess the future of forests and benchmark whether sufficient 
progress has been made against commitments.  For the public 
sector in Indonesia, such international commitments included its 
NDC submitted under the Paris Agreement and implementation 
of conditions for receipt of REDD+ funding. The government’s 
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issuance of moratoria on new palm oil permits and conversion of 
peatlands implies a commitment to rigorously enforce these bans. 
At the same time, the private sector’s pledges under the New York 
Declaration to end deforestation caused by production of 
agricultural commodities, and corporate NDPE policies or sourcing 
requirements that echo those objectives, will be held to account.320 
Spurred on by the scrutiny of civil society, and with their 
guidance, commercial interests have created private governance 
mechanisms designed to fill gaps where public measures have 
fallen short. They have experimented with new approaches to 
standard-setting, monitoring, and technical and financial support 
to improve their palm oil supply chains.321  Separately, and to some 
degree in reaction to these efforts, the government has intensified 
its regulation of this industry. But without strict enforcement 
coordinated at national and local government levels, these private 
initiatives will not be able to control illegal deforestation 
practices.322 The Indonesian government has indeed 
acknowledged that if fully enforced, a permanent moratorium on 
conversion of primary forests and peatlands would be the most 
effective policy measure to achieve its targeted emission 
reductions, which are “significant for the country and for the 
world.”323 
While government bans may stop destructive conduct, they do 
not provide guideposts for what is an acceptable alternative. A 
Forest Trends study on aligning corporate and national 
commitments in Indonesia describes the power of synergies 
between public and private efforts: 
Corporations require a regulatory and policy environment that 
supports their zero deforestation ambitions. Likewise, 
governments are more likely to achieve their NDC goals with the 
participation of key corporate actors implementing reduced 
deforestation and forest landscape restoration corporate policies 
across their operations . . . .Corporations hold tremendous power 
to shape landscape management practices on the lands they 
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control—directly and indirectly—throughout their supply chains. 
If corporate commitments and actions can be properly aligned with 
government policies and NDC goals, the private and public sectors 
will be able to reinforce each other’s efforts to achieve zero 
deforestation at subnational, national, and global scales.324 
The latest generation of private sector governance mechanisms – 
the RSPO’s 2018 P&C standards and the AF’s Core Principles – 
should be embraced by the public sector as an approved path to 
sustainability. The public/private pilot efforts in Kalimantan 
Province to certify all producers on jurisdiction-wide basis are a 
promising step towards standards alignment. Sharing of satellite 
monitoring results, mapping, and ownership data obtained by 
palm oil supply chain actors would also reinforce governments’ 
enforcement capacity. 
It is clear from the IPCC’s Special Report325 that land use and 
forest practices are a key determinant of global emissions levels. 
For Indonesia, which has had the largest GHG emissions from this 
sector, this is especially true. However, the temptation to continue 
on a business as usual course is powerful, at all levels.  Palm oil 
has proven too lucrative a crop for this conflict to be resolved by 
voluntary initiatives alone. Continued pressure is needed from 
civil society, from multilateral bodies such as the UN, and from 
importing countries. Grants, loans, investments, and private 
sector governance mechanisms alike must reinforce this message 
through NDPE standards, monitoring compliance, and imposing 
consequences in the event of breach. But pressure alone is 
insufficient without providing resources, financial incentives, and 
concrete guidance to enable sustainable production.  The 
government should reward good conduct, while penalizing 
producers that flout regulatory requirements. One way would be 
to establish a more favorable concession rate for entities that 
demonstrate compliance with certification requirements. Funding 
from the REDD+ mechanism could compensate the government in 
the event it loses revenue from lowering licensing fees, and could 
be the source of financial support to increase smallholder 
 
324. SCHAAP ET AL., supra note 30, at 4, 10; see also Lambin et al., supra note 
49, at 114 (suggesting that environmental policies need to complement and 
reinforce each other rather than create fragmentation). 
325. IPCC, supra note 24. 
64https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/1
 2019] SEEING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES 65 
productivity, as well as provide training on how to meet the new 
more stringent RSPO Standards.326 Private sector financing 
sources should similarly identify and support only those supply 
chain actors whose practices match these heightened standards. 
2020 is the stocktaking moment. Countries have an obligation 
under the Paris Agreement to step up their ambition and set even 
higher emissions reduction targets. To meet New York Declaration 
goals and their own commitments, private sector actors must 
demonstrate that their supply chains are not responsible for 
destroying critical forests and the biodiversity within them, or for 
exploiting plantation workers or local communities. As 
agricultural commodity production expands in Indonesia and other 
countries, it is essential to ensure the successful implementation 
of public and private governance mechanisms such as those 
outlined in this Article. Even less progress has been made with 
respect to the other agricultural commodities that are major 
drivers of deforestation. However, Indonesia’s LCDI and 
collaborative programs with the private sector can serve as models. 
The world’s forests, and our ability to minimize the drastic impacts 
of climate change, depend on countries like Indonesia meeting and 
exceeding their NDC targets through sustainable land use that 
balances economic development with environmental protection. 
Indonesia’s leadership in this area, together with the actions of 
responsible corporations, can, and must, inspire partnerships 
across the globe to preserve the forest landscape. 
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